Obstacles in the road as intra-Afghan peace talks loom

If there is one embodiment of the phrase “nothing comes easy,” it would have to be the fledgling Afghan peace and reconciliation process.

In February, after much more than a year of grueling negotiations, the US government and the Taliban concluded an agreement that opened up a path for peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The peace talks, known as the intra-Afghan dialogue, were meant to start within days of the inking of the US-Taliban deal. Instead, two obstacles — an Afghan election crisis and a dispute over the release of Taliban prisoners — precluded their launch.

Now, however, the first obstacle has been overcome and the second is in the process of being resolved (albeit slowly), paving the way for the intra-Afghan dialogue to finally begin in the coming days and weeks.

But recent days have brought another potential constraint: A flare-up in tensions between Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his main political rival, Abdullah Abdullah. Ghani has released the names of a 46-member team, known as the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR), which will oversee a separate 21-member negotiating team (appointed by Ghani in March). Abdullah, who heads the HCNR, claims that Ghani lacks the authority to appoint members to the council.

Setting aside the problematic timing of a fresh political spat emerging just as peace talks were poised to begin, there is also a looming structural challenge in play. The Afghan negotiating team is overseen by a council more than twice its size — a classic case of too many cooks in the kitchen. Given Afghanistan’s notoriously fractious political environment, there is a strong risk of tensions among the HCNR’s nearly four dozen members as they compete for influence over a much smaller group of negotiators.

The Afghan negotiating team is overseen by a council more than twice its size — a classic case of too many cooks

Michael Kugelman

At a moment when presenting a common and confident front will be essential for Kabul, potential dysfunction within the Afghan negotiating team’s ranks is the last thing the country needs. It would risk making the Taliban look like the more organized and united negotiating partner. For an Afghan government already widely believed to be coming into talks from a relative position of weakness, this is not an impression it would want to convey.

Fortunately, these new developments with the HCNR, while problematic, are unlikely to prevent the launch of talks. The key questions at this point are what the talks will look like when they begin and what factors might determine their trajectory.

In all likelihood, the intra-Afghan negotiations will begin as the US-Taliban talks did — on the Taliban’s terms. In its negotiations with Washington, the Taliban got what it wanted: Direct talks with America that excluded Kabul, and no cease-fire. Similarly, the intra-Afghan dialogue is likely to begin without a Taliban commitment to a violence reduction agreement or cease-fire. Instead, expect the issue to be a top agenda point for Kabul soon after the talks begin — long before there are serious discussions about post-war power sharing and a post-conflict political system. Eventual Taliban buy-in for a violence reduction plan would deliver a major confidence boost that would bode well for the peace process. If the Taliban refuses, the talks would get off to a rocky start and set a shaky tone.

While peace talks have repeatedly been projected by all parties as Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, in reality a series of non-Afghan factors will heavily influence their trajectory. One is Islamabad. Pakistan has a strong interest in successful talks, given that a political settlement would likely lead to its Taliban ally enjoying a strong degree of power. The question is whether Islamabad will use its considerable influence over the Taliban to pressure the insurgents to reduce violence in order to move the peace process forward — and, if so, if it will be successful.

Another key factor is US policy. American officials may want to take a more hands-off role once talks begin, but the degree to which Washington remains diplomatically present, coaxing each side to push forward, will help determine the fate of the negotiations. Also of note is whether Washington wields its main tool of leverage over the Taliban — its troop posture — to influence insurgent decision-making in talks. Will America, for example, threaten to slow down its troop withdrawal if the Taliban rejects cease-fire demands or stonewalls more broadly? This is unlikely, given the domestic political imperative of a withdrawal. But, for Washington, playing hardball may compel more desirable Taliban responses in the negotiations than mere diplomacy.

The US also carries the potentially potent stick of aid to Kabul. If Washington believes the Afghan negotiating team, through infighting or other problems, is seriously jeopardizing the peace process, it has the option of threatening to impose aid cuts.

However, with American eyes fixed firmly on the exits, sustained US engagement in an intra-Afghan peace process, once one has begun, is far from assured.

• Michael Kugelman is deputy director of the Asia Program and senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Twitter: @michaelkugelman