The return of suicide terrorism in Pakistan?

Since the start of 2022, four high profile suicide attacks have been witnessed in Pakistan. Of these, Daesh-Khorasan carried out two attacks in Peshawar and Sibi, while the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)’s Majid Brigade perpetrated the other two in Balochistan’s Noshki and Panjgur areas. Last year, five such attacks were reported in Pakistan, four by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and one by BLA.  

Alarmingly, as is evident, not just violent extremist groups like Daesh-K and TTP, but Baloch separatists have also embraced suicide terrorism. Against this backdrop, it is important to examine whether the recent wave of suicide attacks point to the potential revival of suicide terrorism in Pakistan? Or are these random terrorist incidents lacking a well thought out method?  

The first suicide attack in Pakistan was reported in 1995 when an Egyptian militant group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, targeted the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda targeted a bus of French engineers working with the Pakistan Navy on submarines in the parking of the Sheraton Hotel, Karachi. From 2002-2006, the annual suicide attacks in Pakistan remained in single digits (21 in total).  

The 2007 Red Mosque operation was a turning point in the evolution of suicide terrorism in Pakistan when suicide attacks soared to 54. From 2007-2015, Pakistan was one of the worst-affected countries by suicide terrorism in the world witnessing 466 attacks, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal. It bears mention that despite suffering one of the largest suicide terrorism campaigns, Pakistan also had the lowest levels of support for such attacks in the Muslim world.  

With the start of Zarb-e-Azb Operation and the implementation of the National Action Plan, however, suicide terrorism declined drastically. For instance, Pakistan only witnessed one suicide attack in 2019, while 2020 saw only two such attacks. Though nine suicide attacks in 2021 and three months of 2022 indicate a potential revival of this disturbing trendline, it needs to be closely monitored this year to reach a conclusive outcome.  

It bears mention that despite suffering one of the largest suicide terrorism campaigns, Pakistan also had the lowest levels of support for such attacks in the Muslim world.  

Abdul Basit Khan

Conceptually, (asymmetric) conflict escalation is directly proportional to suicide terrorism and vice versa. The upward trendline during the 2007-2015 period corresponds to escalating terrorism in Pakistan as well. On the contrary, the drastic decline in terrorism from 2015-2020 witnessed a substantial decline in suicide terrorism as well. Hence, the preliminary analysis suggests that the potential revival of suicide terrorism is linked with the steady rise in terrorist and ethno-separatist attacks in Pakistan coinciding with the US withdrawal and the revival of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. These two developments have provided a more permissible operational environment to Pakistan-focused terrorist and ethno-separatist groups to plot and execute attacks.  

Suicide attacks are hard to deter; even if suicide bombers are eliminated or detonate their vests prematurely, still they could cause widespread damage. Arguably, the incentive structure of suicide terrorism is complex, if the attack is successful, it sends a strong signal to a conventionally superior adversary. On the contrary, if the suicide bomber fails, even then he’s hailed a martyr. 

Statistically, nine suicide attacks in two years are concerning but far from constituting a revival of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. For Pakistan’s internal security, the more alarming part is Baloch separatists’ adoption of suicide terrorism. BLA’s slain commander and the mastermind of the 2018 Chinese consulate attack Aslam Achu revived the Majid Brigade in Afghanistan, responsible for a self-sacrificing mission. Achu’s son was one of five attackers who perpetrated the 2018 Chinese consulate attack in Karachi. Subsequently, BLA used suicide terrorism in targeting the 2019 Pearl Continental Hotel, Gwadar, the 2020 Pakistan Stock Exchange, the 2021 Gwadar suicide attack against a Chinese engineer and the 2022 assaults on the paramilitary Frontier Corps in Noshki and Panjgur.  

The adoption of suicide terrorism by Baloch separatists marks a significant shift in their insurgent campaign. It was a strategic but difficult decision as the Baloch separatists feared losing external support by switching to this modus operandi. Likewise, they also risked being categorized alongside terrorist groups like TTP and strengthening the Pakistani state’s narrative against them.  

Similarly, Daesh-K’s suicide attacks in Peshawar and Sibi point to its growing operational capabilities and geographical reach in Pakistan. In the last few years, Daesh-K was active in Afghanistan but its operations in Pakistan were reduced to low-end attacks such as targeted assassinations or grenade attacks, mostly in and around the Peshawar city and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s merged tribal districts. Daesh-K has announced its return by two suicide attacks in Peshawar and Sibi.  

Recently, Daesh-K published a 28-page statement in Pashto-language, where it has provided the ideological rationale of its terrorist operations in Pakistan and took TTP head-on for limiting its campaign to hard targets and disassociating from transnational militancy. Last year, TTP denounced Daesh-K and termed its claim to the so-called caliphate as bogus. Daesh-K’s rebuttal of TTP is alarming as it could result in clashes between the two groups on the Pakistani soil as well outbidding violence. Given TTP’s decision to limit its attacks to the Pakistani security forces, Daesh-K has overtaken the space of anti-Shia militancy.  

To pre-empt suicide terrorism, as it is hard to deter, Pakistan will have to invest its policy capital in disrupting the recruitment and training of suicide bombers. For this purpose, the profiles of suicide bombers would provide important clues about their backgrounds as well as push and pull factors of their recruitment. The training centers are situated in Afghanistan where suicide vests are manufactured and suicide bombers are trained. How Pakistan navigates the challenge of the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan tolerating Pakistan-focused terrorist groups would be central to the country’s evolving trendline of suicide terrorism.       

— The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.

Twitter: @basitresearcher.