Drone havoc in Ukraine puts Iran’s asymmetric warfare advantage into sharp relief

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Firefighters struggle to halt a blaze after a Russian attack using Iranian drones destroyed a Kyiv residential building. (AFP)
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Iranian kamikaze drones ready for launch during a drill in Iran. (AFP)
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Ukrainian military experts show downed drones that Russia allegedly uses for striking critical infrastructure and other targets in Ukraine. (AFP file)
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Updated 22 January 2023
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Drone havoc in Ukraine puts Iran’s asymmetric warfare advantage into sharp relief

  • Russia’s use of UAVs shows folly of ignoring warnings about Iranian conventional weapons threat
  • Strategic utility of Shahed-136 lies in the fact it can be mass produced at a relatively low cost

WASHINGTON, D.C.: The distinctive sound of an approaching wave of loitering munitions, commonly known as kamikaze drones, has become all too familiar over the cities of Ukraine since Iran began supplying the Russian military with its domestically designed and manufactured Shahed-136.

With its roughly 2,000 km range and 30 kg explosive payload, these destructive, swarming drones have become an almost daily terror for civilians in the capital Kyiv since September, routinely striking apartment buildings and energy infrastructure.

“The Russian purchase and deployment of Iranian drones has allowed Russia to attack the broad range of civilian infrastructure in Ukraine,” David DesRoches, a military expert at the US National Defense University, told Arab News.

Designed and built by an Iranian defense manufacturer closely linked to the regime’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Shahed is low-tech compared with the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems developed by other nations.

However, their strategic utility lies in the fact that they can be mass produced at a relatively low cost. According to Ukrainian officials, the Russian military has ordered more than 2,000 of these drones and has been in talks to establish a joint manufacturing facility on Russian soil.

A recent report by the Washington Institute also claims the Kremlin has expressed interest in purchasing more advanced Iranian drones, such as the Arash, which has a longer range and can carry a larger explosive payload than the Shahed.




A drone flies over Kyiv during an attack on October 17, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (AFP file)

But before Iran’s drones made their debut in the largest and most significant conflict on the European continent since the Second World War, they were battle-tested across multiple fronts in the Middle East where the IRGC and its proxies are active.

Iran has been able to trial its drone technology against US-built air defenses stationed in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf, including the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. Now that know-how is proving invaluable to the Russian military against the Western-backed Ukrainians.

Battle-testing of Iranian drones in Ukraine against Western and Soviet-era air defense systems will undoubtedly also enhance their strategic use in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and beyond, creating new security headaches for Israel and the wider Arab region.




Wreckage of an Iranian kamikaze drone, which was shot down in Odessa on September 25, 2022, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine. (AFP)

Kamikaze drones pose a unique problem for modern militaries. Although advanced air defense systems are able to shoot down most Shaheds before they reach their intended target, a sufficient number will inevitably break through, raining down on Ukrainian apartment buildings and civilian infrastructure.

“The drones, which fly below the radar level of conventional air defense radar, are able to penetrate into Ukraine and cause more damage than the Russians would be able to do on their own,” DesRoches said.




Firefighters struggle to halt a blaze after a Russian attack using Iranian drones destroyed a Kyiv residential building. (AFP)

“A distributed drone attack against civilian infrastructure across a large country means that you will never have enough assets to ‘kill’ all the drones. It is far more expensive to defeat a drone than to launch one, and no one has enough equipment to protect every electrical substation in their country.”

He added: “By targeting them at civilian infrastructure, Russia is able to force Ukraine to dissipate its air defense assets and may be able, at some future point, to mass missiles and drones against a significant military target. So their impact has been significant.”

According to some analysts, as a result of prior Western inaction on the proliferation of Iran’s “conventional” weapons, as opposed to its nuclear ambitions, the regime’s kamikaze drones have now been exported to Europe, potentially posing a long-term security threat to the wider continent.

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These analysts say that warnings to Western officials about the threat posed by Iran’s burgeoning drone program long went unheeded, allowing the regime to develop a large manufacturing base and trade network relatively unimpeded.

According to a UK defense intelligence report, published before the outbreak of war in Ukraine, various versions of the Shahed have been covertly deployed by the regime, including in an attack on the British-flagged oil tanker MT Mercer Street in 2021, which killed two, including a British civilian.

Prior to that attack, in September 2019, a volley of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones slammed into the Abqaiq and Khurais oil fields in Saudi Arabia. US Central Command believes the attack originated from Iran, crossing Iraqi airspace.




Wreckage of Iranian weapons used to attack Saudi Arabia's Khurais oil field and Aramco facilities in Abqaiq in 2019 are displayed at a Defense Ministry press conference. (AN file photo)

Following that attack, the American Enterprise Institute urged the US government to retaliate directly against IRGC drone facilities.

“Increasing American economic pressure has not deterred Iranian military or nuclear deal-violation escalation, and American military actions have only changed the precise shape of Iranian military escalation,” it said at the time.

The 2019 attack was also the first known instance of the combined use of cruise missiles and kamikaze drones to target a major energy facility, setting a dangerous precedent that foreshadowed the same tactic’s use in Europe against Ukraine’s power grid.

Western intelligence officials believe the Russian military is growing increasingly reliant on Shaheds as a substitute for more expensive and difficult-to-manufacture long-range precision guided intermediate range missiles, in part due to Western sanctions on Russia’s purchase of crucial electronic components.




This handout picture provided by the Iranian Army on May 28, 2022, shows Iranian military commanders visiting an underground drone base in an unknown location in Iran. (AFP)

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, a New York-based bipartisan think tank, tweeted that the US and its allies had been “behind the curve” in tackling Iranian drone proliferation.

Although the Biden administration has announced fresh sanctions targeting Iranian arms manufacturers responsible for building Shaheds, Brodsky said the West squandered precious time that could have been spent nipping the Iranian drone threat in the bud.

“Washington and allies should have been laser focused on this a decade ago with respect to Iran. But the nuclear file dominated all,” he said, referring to the now largely defunct 2015 Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Omri Ceren, foreign policy adviser to US Senator Ted Cruz, was even more direct in his criticism of the Biden White House — for allowing Iran’s drone proliferation to reach this point and relying on Russia as the go-between with Iran on nuclear negotiations.

He tweeted: “Team Biden has made it a day 1 priority to weaken arms restrictions between Iran and Russia. They rushed to the UN to rescind the arms embargo vs Iran.”




European Union delegates attend talks to revive the Iranian nuclear deal. (AFP file)

Jake Sullivan, the administration’s national security adviser, recently acknowledges that Iran was likely “contributing to widespread war crimes” in Ukraine by actively providing a large number of combat drones and other weapons to the Russian military.

Nevertheless, serious questions remain over whether new sanctions on Iran’s drone manufacturing industry will come too little too late following years of a singular policy focus on reaching a nuclear agreement with Tehran.

Lessons provided by Israel, which has perhaps the most experience of neutralizing the Iranian drone threat, could offer US and European policymakers greater clarity, encouraging a more rapid response.

According to the Israeli defense think tank Alma, Iran’s extraterritorial Quds Force has established joint drone production facilities with a secretive division of Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, known as Unit 127.




Military drones are displayed at a Hezbollah memorial landmark in the hilltop bastion of Mleeta, near the Lebanese southern village of Jarjouaa. (AFP file)

Satellite imagery provided by Alma shows what appear to be sprawling bases, which reportedly belong to Hezbollah, established in Al-Qusayr, Syria, near the Lebanese border, and in the far eastern Syrian desert city of Palmyra.

A number of airstrikes late last year attributed to Israel (although never officially claimed) directly targeted these bases and suspected joint drone manufacturing centers. Some analysts would like to see the West similarly target Iran’s drone technology at its source.

In the meantime, DesRoches said Ukraine’s Western allies must continue to provide air defense systems, while also helping to reinforce the structural integrity of critical infrastructure to withstand air attacks.

“Instead of starting with the threat and trying to defeat it, a state needs to start with its vulnerabilities and look to protect them, assuming that a drone will get through,” he said.

Hardening key energy facilities and developing a multilayered defensive plan based on this assumption was more realistic in meeting immediate needs in blunting the impact of Iranian drones, he said.

“Soldiers don’t like to think in these ways, and the profit a defense firm will make on sandbags is much less than will be made on a surface to air missile. But national security interests are best served by a vulnerability-based assessment of drone threats.”

It does appear the Biden administration is coming to the realization — belatedly — that Iran’s asymmetric drone capabilities and proliferation have become a global security threat.

 


Egypt unveils ancient rock-cut tombs and burial shafts in Luxor

Updated 21 min 21 sec ago
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Egypt unveils ancient rock-cut tombs and burial shafts in Luxor

CAIRO: Egypt unveiled several discoveries near the famed city of Luxor on Wednesday, including ancient rock-cut tombs and burial shafts dating back 3,600 years.

They were unearthed at the causeway of Queen Hatshepsut’s funerary temple at Deir Al-Bahri on the Nile’s West Bank, according to a statement released by Zahi Hawass Foundation for Antiquities & Heritage. It said it worked in tandem with the Supreme Council of Antiquities on the site since September 2022.

Artifacts found at the tombs included bronze coins with the image of Alexander the Great dating to the Time of Ptolemy I (367-283), children’s toys made of clay, cartonnage and funerary masks that covered mummies, winged scarabs, beads and funerary amulets.

Hawass told reporters that the discoveries could “reconstruct history” and offer an understanding of the type of programs ancient Egyptians designed inside a temple.

The Archeologists also found the remains of Queen Hatshepsut’s Valley Temple, rock-cut tombs dating back to the Middle Kingdom (1938 B.C. — 1630 B.C.), burial shafts from the 17th dynasty, the tomb of Djehuti-Mes and part of the Assassif Ptolemaic Necropolis.

The rock-cut tombs had been previously robbed during the Ptolemaic period and later. Still, the Egyptian teams uncovered some artifacts such as pottery tables that were used to offer bread, wine and meat.

Inside the burial shafts dating back to 1580 B.C. — 1550 B.C., anthropoid wooden coffins were found, including one that belonged to a young child. It remained intact since its burial some 3,600 years ago.


Libya’s eastern parliament approves transitional justice law

Updated 44 min 44 sec ago
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Libya’s eastern parliament approves transitional justice law

  • The UN mission to Libya has repeatedly called for an inclusive, rights-based transitional justice and reconciliation process in the country

TRIPOLI: Libya’s eastern-based parliament has approved a national reconciliation and transitional justice law, three lawmakers said, a measure aimed at reunifying the oil-producing country after over a decade of factional conflict.

The House of Representatives spokesperson, Abdullah Belaihaq, said on the X platform that the legislation was passed on Tuesday by a majority of the session’s attendees in Libya’s largest second city Benghazi.

However, implementing the law could be challenging as Libya has been divided since a 2014 civil war that spawned two rival administrations vying for power in east and west following the NATO-backed uprising that toppled Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.

“I hope that it (the law) will be in effect all over the country and will not face any difficulty,” House member Abdulmenam Alorafi told Reuters by phone on Wednesday.

The UN mission to Libya has repeatedly called for an inclusive, rights-based transitional justice and reconciliation process in the North African country.

A political process to end years of institutional division and outright warfare has been stalled since an election scheduled for December 2021 collapsed amid disputes over the eligibility of the main candidates.

In Tripoli, there is the Government of National Unity under Prime Minister Abdulhamid Al-Dbeibah that was installed through a UN-backed process in 2021, but the parliament no longer recognizes its legitimacy. Dbeibah has vowed not to cede power to a new government without national elections.

There are two competing legislative bodies — the HoR that was elected in 2014 as the national parliament with a four-year mandate to oversee a political transition, and the High Council of State in Tripoli formed as part of a 2015 political agreement and drawn from a parliament first elected in 2012.

The Tripoli-based Presidential Council, which came to power with GNU, has been working on a reconciliation project and holding “a comprehensive conference” with the support of the UN and African Union. But it has been unable to bring all rival groups together because of their continuing differences.


Will Lebanon fill the presidential power vacuum or slide into further uncertainty?

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Will Lebanon fill the presidential power vacuum or slide into further uncertainty?

  • Contenders for the presidency carry the baggage of past conflicts, failures in office, and problematic allegiances
  • Weakening of Hezbollah and the ouster of Syria’s Assad are likely to influence power dynamics in the Lebanese parliament 

DUBAI: Wracked by economic crisis and the recent conflict between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, Lebanon faces a historic opportunity this week to break its political paralysis and elect a new president.

There are many contenders for the coveted role, but whoever is chosen by members of the Lebanese Parliament to form the next government will have important implications for the nation’s recovery and trajectory.

If Thursday’s election is successful, it could end the debilitating power vacuum that has prevailed since Michel Aoun’s presidential term ended in October 2022, leaving governance in Lebanon in limbo.

Settling on a candidate is now more urgent than ever, as Lebanon faces mounting pressure to stabilize its political and economic landscape ahead of the impending expiration of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah.

None of Lebanon’s major parliamentary blocs have officially announced a presidential candidate, but several potential contenders have emerged.

Balancing the demilitarization of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Israeli forces will require delicate maneuvering. (AFP)

One possible candidate is General Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, who local media have tipped as the most likely winner.

Widely regarded as politically neutral, Aoun’s military experience and perceived impartiality could bring stability and credibility, both domestically and internationally.

His success would hinge on building a capable Cabinet with a comprehensive plan to stabilize the country’s governance, economic recovery and security, as well as lead postwar reconstruction efforts and the return of those displaced.

Balancing the demilitarization of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern territories in accordance with the UN Resolution 1701 would also require delicate maneuvering.

However, his candidacy faces legal hurdles due to a constitutional requirement that two years must pass between his military role and the presidency.

Another potential contender is Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces. As a vocal Hezbollah critic with significant support among some Christian communities, Geagea could appeal to anti-Hezbollah factions.

His extensive political experience and advocacy for reform could help him to prioritize state-building, which many Lebanese see as crucial for the country’s future. His anti-Hezbollah stance could also restructure Lebanon’s stance in regional conflicts and international relations.

However, his polarizing history from Lebanon’s civil war could prove to be a barrier to national unity, raising fears that his candidacy could deepen divisions in Lebanon’s already fragmented political system.

Suleiman Frangieh, head of the pro-Hezbollah Marada movement, is another possibility, but risks alienating Christian communities and international allies.

Hailing from a prominent political dynasty, Frangieh is the grandson of a former president and has himself held various governmental and parliamentary roles. However, being a close ally of Hezbollah and the former Assad regime in Syria makes him a polarizing figure.

Finally, Jihad Azour, a former finance minister and International Monetary Fund official, represents a technocratic option with broad political appeal.

Lebanon faces a historic opportunity this week to break its political paralysis. (AFP)

He enjoys support from key factions, including the Lebanese Forces, the Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt, several Sunni MPs, influential Maronite religious figures and opposition groups.

Azour’s economic expertise could help to address Lebanon’s financial crisis, but some among the opposition view him as a continuation of past administrations.

Securing the presidency in Lebanon requires broad-based political consensus — a challenge in its deeply divided Parliament. Any major faction can block a nomination that does not align with its agenda.

Under Lebanon’s constitution, presidential elections require a two-thirds majority in the first round of parliamentary voting (86 out of 128 members) and a simple majority of 65 votes in subsequent rounds.

The Lebanese president’s powers, as defined by the constitution, reflect a blend of ceremonial and executive functions within a confessional system of governance that allocates political roles based on religious representation.

The president’s powers are limited by those of the prime minister, the council of ministers and Parliament, reflecting Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system established by the 1943 National Pact and reaffirmed by the 1989 Taif Agreement.

Lebanese presidents are traditionally drawn from the Maronite Christian community, as stipulated by the confessional system. This role is critical in maintaining the delicate political balance in the country.

Thursday’s election comes at a turbulent moment for Lebanon and its neighbors, which could impact the vote’s outcome.

A UNIFIL military vehicle conducts a patrol in the southern Lebanese village of Borj El Mlouk. (AFP)

Hezbollah has long dominated Lebanon’s political landscape, parliamentary dynamics and government composition. However, its devastating war with Israel, which began in October 2023 and ended with a fragile ceasefire in November 2024, gutted its leadership and depleted much of its public support.

Hezbollah’s failure to deter Israel’s war in Gaza or mount a sufficient defense against Israeli air and ground attacks in southern and eastern Lebanon has raised doubts about its remaining political influence in steering the selection of a presidential candidate.

The election also follows the sudden downfall of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, toppled by armed opposition groups after a 13-year civil war. This shift has profoundly impacted Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah and other factions in Lebanon.

Syria’s influence on Lebanon historically included backing Maronite militias, interfering in political decisions, maintaining a 29-year military occupation and facilitating the flow of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.

A destroyed mosque in the southern Lebanese village of Khiam. (AFP)

The change of power in Damascus adds uncertainty to Lebanon’s already fragile situation.

Regardless of these regional shifts, Lebanon’s next president will face the daunting task of guiding the country out of its economic mire while leading postwar reconstruction efforts.

Lebanon’s economic situation remains dire, with its financial collapse in 2019 described by the World Bank as one of the worst in modern history.

The Lebanese pound has lost more than 98 percent of its value against the US dollar on the black market, leading to hyperinflation and eroding the purchasing power of citizens.

Public services, including electricity, health care and water supply, have nearly collapsed, and unemployment has soared. More than 80 percent of the population now lives below the poverty line, according to the UN.

Efforts to secure international aid, including talks with the IMF, have stalled due to political gridlock and resistance to reforms. The new president will need regional and international standing to rally support for Lebanon’s recovery.

Whoever secures the presidency will face a formidable task in addressing Lebanon’s economic, political and social challenges. The alternative is continued paralysis, with devastating consequences for the country’s future.

 


Army chief Gen. Joseph Aoun seems increasingly likely to be Lebanon’s new president

Lebanese Army Commander Gen. Joseph Aoun is seen at the government palace in Beirut, Lebanon. (File/AP)
Updated 08 January 2025
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Army chief Gen. Joseph Aoun seems increasingly likely to be Lebanon’s new president

  • On eve of latest attempt by MPs to agree on a candidate, reports suggest Hezbollah’s preferred candidate ‘may announce his withdrawal’
  • French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian arrives in Beirut and is expected to attend the parliamentary presidential election session on Thursday

BEIRUT: A day before the Lebanese parliament was due to assemble to discuss the election of a president — an office that has remained vacant for more than 26 months — there was a flurry of activity on Wednesday including intensified discussions, communications and declarations.
Reports in the afternoon suggested that Hezbollah’s preferred candidate, Suleiman Frangieh, “may announce his withdrawal from the presidential race,” leaving army chief Gen. Joseph Aoun as the leading contender.
The day was marked by a visit from French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian, who arrived in Beirut on Tuesday evening and was expected to attend the parliamentary presidential election session on Thursday.
He held meetings with several political and parliamentary figures, during which he reportedly recommended Aoun for “consideration without any preconditions.” This was in relation to the bloc of Hezbollah and Amal Movement MPs who opposed the general’s nomination on the grounds that his election would require a constitutional amendment because he still serves in his capacity as commander of the army.
The head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, MP Mohammed Raad, was quoted after meeting the French envoy as saying: “Hezbollah will not stand in the way of the Lebanese people’s consensus on the name of a president for the republic.”
Media estimates suggest that Aoun, if he secures the support of Hezbollah and Amal, would win 95 votes in the 128-member parliament. This level of support would mean a constitutional amendment is not needed.
Events leading up to Thursday’s session suggested all parliamentary blocs are committed to attending, which would ensure the quorum required for the election is reached. The presidency has been vacant since former president Michel Aoun’s term ended in October 2022. Previous attempts to appoint a successor failed amid disagreements between political factions about suitable candidates.
Prime Minister Najib Mikati said he was feeling “joy for the first time since the presidential vacancy as, God willing, we will have a new president for the republic tomorrow,” raising hopes that the office might finally be filled.
One political observer said there is now the real possibility that “all members of parliament, regardless of their political affiliations, would choose their candidate within the framework of consensus and understanding during the voting sessions, which will remain open as confirmed by the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, until” a decision is reached.
This renewed optimism was in contrast to the prior skepticism about the possibility that parliamentary blocs would be able to successfully convene a session to elect a president, given their previous failures to reach a consensus on a candidate who could secure a majority in the first round of voting.
The electoral session on Thursday will be the 13th of its kind. During the previous one, in June 2024, the candidate favored by Hezbollah and its allies, former minister and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Frangieh, who was close to the Assad regime in Syria, faced the candidate favored by the Free Patriotic Movement and opposition parties, former Minister of Finance Jihad Azour, who is director of the Middle East and Central Asia department at the International Monetary Fund.
During that session, Frangieh received 51 votes in the first round of voting and Azour 59. When the totals were announced, Hezbollah and Amal MPs withdrew from the session, thereby depriving it of the quorum required for a second round of voting, as stipulated by the constitution.
Against this background of long-running political divisions resulting in deadlock within the parliament, and in light of the war between Israel and Hezbollah, the number of presidential candidates has dwindled from 11 to just a few names. Aside from Aoun, Frangieh and Azour, the other candidates whose names continued to circulate to varying degrees on Wednesday included Samir Geagea, the head of the Lebanese Forces party, which heads the parliament’s biggest Christian bloc. However, he is fiercely opposed by Hezbollah.
Less-discussed candidates include the acting chief of Lebanon’s General Security Directorate, Elias Al-Bayssari; MP Ibrahim Kanaan, who resigned from the Free Patriotic Movement to join the Independent Consultative Parliamentary Gathering; and former ambassador Georges Al-Khoury, a retired brigadier general. Al-Khoury has the support of Maronite Patriarchate, Speaker Berri and the Free Patriotic Movement, but the majority of the opposition rejects his candidacy.
MP Neemat Frem, who has presented a political and economic vision for the country, is also a candidate. He is on good terms with the Patriarchate and the opposition. Others include Farid Al-Khazen, who is also on good terms with Berri and close to the Patriarchate, and Ziad Baroud, a human rights activist and former minister of interior who is seen as a consensus candidate.
The parliamentary blocs continued to hold talks on Wednesday afternoon to discuss preferred candidates. Lebanese Forces MP Fadi Karam said: “Starting today, there has been a significant shift toward having Joseph Aoun as a president.”
During a meeting on Wednesday, the Maronite Archbishops Council called for “a national parliamentary awakening that leads tomorrow to the election of a president who brings together the country’s sons and daughters within the framework of national unity, solidarity and reform, allowing Lebanon to regain its leading role in the East.”
The archbishops said: “The opportunity has become appropriate and available for national deliberation on the importance of Lebanon’s progress toward a positive neutrality that saves the country from the damage of conflicts and drives it toward a healthy cycle of one fruitful national life.”


UAE adds 19 individuals, entities to terrorism list over Muslim Brotherhood links

Updated 08 January 2025
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UAE adds 19 individuals, entities to terrorism list over Muslim Brotherhood links

  • Designation is part of UAE’s national and international efforts to dismantle terrorist financial networks

LONDON: The UAE designated 19 individuals and entities as terrorists on Wednesday due to their connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is classified as a terror group in the UAE.

Abu Dhabi placed 11 individuals and eight entities on the country’s Local Terrorist List, the WAM news agency reported. All the organizations are based in the UK, while the individuals, except two, are Emirati nationals.

The decision is part of the UAE’s national and international efforts to dismantle networks associated with the direct and indirect financing of terrorism, according to WAM.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia also classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terror group.

The list of individuals as published by WAM includes:

1. Yousuf Hassan Ahmed Al-Mulla — Current nationality: Sweden, former nationality: Liberia.

2. Saeed Khadim Ahmed bin Touq Al-Marri — Nationality: Turkiye/UAE.

3. Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim Ali Al-Hammadi — Nationality: Sweden/UAE.

4. Ilham Abdullah Ahmed Al-Hashimi — Nationality: UAE.

5. Jasem Rashid Khalfan Rashid Al-Shamsi — Nationality: UAE.

6. Khaled Obaid Yousuf Buatabh Al-Zaabi — Nationality: UAE.

7. Abdulrahman Hassan Munif Abdullah Hassan Al-Jabri — Nationality: UAE.

8. Humaid Abdullah Abdulrahman Al-Jarman Al-Nuaimi — Nationality: UAE.

9. Abdulrahman Omar Salem Bajbair Al-Hadrami — Nationality: Yemen.

10. Ali Hassan Ali Hussein Al-Hammadi — Nationality: UAE.

11. Mohammed Ali Hassan Ali Al-Hammadi — Nationality: UAE.

 
The list of entities as published by WAM includes:

1. Cambridge Education and Training Center Ltd. — Based in: UK.

2. IMA6INE Ltd. — Based in: UK.

3. Wembley Tree Ltd. — Based in: UK.

4. Waslaforall — Based in: UK.

5. Future Graduates Ltd. — Based in: UK.

6. Yas for Investment and Real Estate — Based in: UK.

7. Holdco UK Properties Limited — Based in: UK.

8. Nafel Capital — Based in: UK.