Pakistan's threat landscape and a new militant group on the block

Pakistan’s multi-actor threat landscape evolves at a rapid space throwing up policy puzzles even for its seasoned watchers. It is a race against time to stay abreast of new trends of militancy in Pakistan. Though Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist groups carry out attacks more frequently, some obscure militant groups also lurk in the shadows.

According to the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)’s website, the interior ministry has outlawed 78 militant groups in Pakistan which brings into sharp focus the sheer magnitude of the security challenges in the country. For instance, though TTP is one group, it is a conglomerate of more than 30 like-minded factions. Likewise, the Baloch separatists have several factions and sub-factions as well. Against this backdrop, it is vital to keep the context of a new group’s emergence in view for a nuanced understanding. 

In February, a little-known militant group, Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), appeared on Pakistan’s security landscape. TJP claimed shooting two security officials in Chaman, Balochistan. Through social media posts, TJP’s spokesman Mullah Qasim announced the group’s formation and outlined transforming Pakistan into a Taliban-like Shariah state through an armed struggle as its objective. Qasim mentioned Abdullah Yaghistani, possibly a pseudo name, as TJP’s central leader. Yaghistan refers to the ex-FATA region’s pre-partition geographical status as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and the British Raj. Qasim maintains that the group’s adherents are followers of a notable Deobandi scholar and founder of the Silk Letter Movement, Mahmudul Hassan (late). TJP’s aim is to revive the Silk Letter Movement in Pakistan through an armed struggle. The Silk Letter Movement refers to a covert armed insurrection from 1913-1920 to retake control of the Indian subcontinent from the British Raj by seeking assistance from the Ottoman and German Empires and the then Emirate of Afghanistan. 

However, TJP spokesman’s above-mentioned assertions remain one-sided unverifiable claims which require critical scrutiny as nothing is known about the group’s organizational structure, members and leaders. Three distinct views exist among the Afghanistan-Pakistan watchers about TJP’s emergence, structure and underlying objectives, which will be discussed later. 

So far, based on available open-source information and the attack patterns, it is safe to make the following three assumptions. First, despite being shrouded in mystery, TJP is not a social media propaganda group, notwithstanding two dubious and disputed responsibility claims, it exists physically. 

Second, TJP is not a novice group looking for instant glorifications through social media posts. Rather, the attack pattern reveals that TJP militants have combat experience with a sophisticated skillset. So far, the group has claimed six attacks, three in Swat (Kabal), Lakki Marwat and D.I. Khan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the same number in Balochistan’s Bolan, Qilla Saifullah (Muslim Bagh) and Chaman districts. Of these, one was a shooting incident and the remaining five were high-profile suicide attacks against hardened targets. Such coordinated attacks against hardened targets are not possible without an elaborate network involving explosive experts, logisticians, and surveillance units, among others. Hence, it is safe to conclude that TJP has an entrenched network between Balochistan’s Pashtun areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 

Third, though TTP maintains it has no knowledge of TJP’s existence, the group has not disputed the latter’s credit claims. Likewise, TJP has not accepted responsibility for the attacks that TTP has carried out. On the contrary, TJP’s credit claim of the March 6 suicide bombing targeting the paramilitary Frontier Corp’s vehicle in Bloan was also claimed by Daesh-Pakistan. Though TJP has tried to step on Daesh-Pakistan’s toes, it has shied away from claiming TTP’s attacks. More intriguingly, in Pakistan’s competitive landscape, militant groups are turf-conscious and do not tolerate new challengers in their backyards. TTP’s silence in the face of TJP’s five high-profile suicide attacks is deafening and instructive.

Such coordinated attacks against hardened targets are not possible without an elaborate network involving explosive experts, logisticians, and surveillance units, among others.

Abdul Basit Khan

Beyond circumstantial evidence, three predominant views can be identified on TJP’s goals and emergence. 

First, TJP militants possibly comprise a faction of TTP to which the latter is outsourcing its suicide attacks. Arguably, this arrangement provides TTP with more bandwidth vis-à-vis its more independent-minded factions like Jamaat-ul-Ahar (JuA). Interestingly, TJP burst onto the scene after JuA’s leaders Mukarram Khorasani and Mufti Sarbakaf Mohmand claimed the Peshawar Mosque suicide bombing in January to avenge the killing of their chief Omar Khalid Khorasani. The attack left over 100 people, mostly policemen, dead. TTP disowned the attack as it violated its code of conduct. Hence, to avoid public embarrassment and manage JuA-like factions, TJP offers a way out. On the one hand, it provides TTP with plausible deniability, on the other, it helps the group keep JuA-like factions in its fold. 

Second, TJP could be a joint venture of TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) group to collaborate against a common adversary. It bears mention that since the revival of militancy in Pakistan, HGB group has carried out more suicide attacks than TTP. Recently, both groups have jointly claimed two attacks against the security forces in Mardan and North Waziristan (Shawal) districts. TJP could be the lynchpin responsible for suicide missions of the TTP-HGB joint strategy.

Third, TJP militants could be former operatives of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). It bears mention that in February 2020, a senior TTP ideologue urged AQIS in a letter to reconsider its regional and global aspiration and merge with TTP. While two AQIS faction merged with TTP, other AQIS militants may be using TJP’s moniker to continue militancy in Pakistan. 

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)’s suicide squad, the Majeed Brigade, offers the closest parallel to TJP’s emergence and operations in Pakistan. For instance, the Majeed Brigade also carries out high-profile and suicide attacks, including daring gun-and-bomb attacks against fortified military camps. The available data suggests that TJP has done the same so far. 

TJP’s emergence and headline grabbing attacks underscore the complex nature of Pakistan’s evolving security challenges. An accurate understanding of how different militant groups emerge and operate will enable the law enforcement agencies to stay ahead of the evolving curve and respond befittingly. 

— The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter @basitresearcher.