NEW DELHI, 21 December 2003 — Saddam Hussein succeeded when he survived.
The safest place, and certainly one more comfortable than a “rat-hole”, for Saddam Hussein after his defeat is a prison. A grave might have been safe, but not as comfortable. On the other hand, George Bush and Tony Blair might have been far comfortable if Saddam was in a grave instead of in their custody.
As reports of early interrogation indicate, Saddam was reduced to a hunted, disheveled and lonely existence. The idea that he was in some kind of alternative headquarters, commanding a fine-tuned resistance is a myth put out partly to explain the high casualties that Americans have suffered ever since George Bush thought his mission had been accomplished with the fall of Saddam’s statue on April 9. The Iraqi Fedayeen is a shadow army of the kind that has existed in other struggles against actual or perceived colonialism. It is a network of cells held together by conviction. Those who commit their lives in suicide missions do so for motives more substantial than Saddam Hussein.
Although Saddam Hussein was picked up on Dec. 13 the story was missed by the Sunday papers because Washington held on to the news. The story was in fact broken by the official Iranian news agency, indicating, if nothing else, that Tehran knows as much about the neighborhood as Baghdad. The Sunday Times, published from London, did not have Saddam, but it had a pretty good alternative on the 14th: An interview with Saddam’s second wife, Samira Shahbandar. The interview was done at a restaurant called La Cottage, in Ba’albeck, near Beirut. Samira provided some interesting details. Saddam visited her on April 9, when he broke down while claiming that he had been betrayed. She last saw him at the Syrian border, when he said his farewells, and gave her a briefcase with $5 million in cash and 10 kg of gold bars before she went across with her son, Ali. (She has got permission to live in France and is headed for Paris in January.) But the most significant revelation was elsewhere. Saddam, she said, was in regular touch with her, and either called her or wrote to her at least once a week.
The most elementary fact about modern telecommunications is that the location of any call can be traced. Samira did not reach Lebanon on a flying carpet. She was helped by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence agencies; so they knew where she was. The best intelligence in the Arab region is with the Egyptians; it is highly unlikely that they were unaware of Samira’s whereabouts. It would be equally unlikely that CIA would not have sought such information, and got it as well. Samira’s alias would not have fooled the juniormost operator. If the Sunday Times could locate Samira, surely it was not beyond the CIA’s abilities to do so. It is common sense that the surest way to Saddam would be through his family, if he kept in touch with them. Her telephone would certainly have been tapped, and by more than just the CIA. Every European power would have a vested interest in every scrap of information. This is inference, of course, not fact; but the CIA would have to be incompetent if it could not locate the precise whereabouts of Saddam Hussein through those telephone conversations with Samira.
The question, after that, would be what to do with Saddam. It would make eminent sense to keep him under surveillance in order to trace through him all those who were in touch with him. This would be vital intelligence if Saddam did in fact control a network of Fedayeen who were leading the deathly resistance against the American occupation.
The manner in which Saddam was picked up by a detachment of 600 troops indicates that those who gave the order for the mission knew exactly who the target was, and where the target was located. The decision to arrest Saddam was taken when his use as a trapped prisoner was over; and his use as a “coward” who did not have the decency to die fighting could begin. The decision might, of course, have also been prompted by fears that someone else in the know (Mossad? the Iranians intelligence agency?) was ready to leak the story.
Saddam could not have expected to survive capture, particularly after the way his sons, Uday and Qusay, were gunned down in July. At the very least he must have expected the Americans to treat him in the way he treated his own enemies. The security of a cell must seem like a miracle. As a prisoner of war, Saddam can only be vilified, not arbitrarily eliminated. He is safe not only from American troops, but also from the thousands of Iraqis, particularly Shiites, who have reasons for personal revenge. Some Washington voices are already hoping that he might be killed in prison by someone thirsting for personal revenge, but that would be an amateurish ploy. Saddam is not a conventional prisoner in an open, light-security rehabilitation center.
Nor can Saddam Hussein be sent to Guantanamo Bay. He is going to be the world’s most famous prisoner as long as he lives, and he will now live longer than he might have expected on April 9. He will be tried in Iraq; that is non-negotiable. His trial will be the biggest story of the coming year — assuming it does begin next year. It will be covered in ways that may not entirely fit Tony Blair’s vision of the future of the Muslim world. Most Arabic television channels will not be reporting the trial of Saddam the tyrant, but of Saddam the symbol of anti-Americanism. Saddam was not much of a fox during his eight months in the desert, but he could become one during the years ahead in prison.
Saddam in power was a tyrant; Saddam in jail will be a victim. The Americans did themselves little good by putting out pictures of Saddam’s teeth being tested. Any suggestion of humiliation always invites sympathy, particularly on the Arab street. As we have learned from other instances of history, the difference between tyrant and hero can sometimes be just a matter of circumstance. It would be dangerous for the Americans to permit one image to morph into the other.
Saddam will have enough opportunity to reposition himself during his trial, whenever that starts. Some very good legal minds will enjoy the opportunity of defending him, with fame as sufficient reward for their efforts. He is sharp enough to know how to handle his own space in the limelight. Saddam was forced to communicate with the world through amateurish audio or video tapes sent to media. He is an author of sorts, having inflicted bad fiction on Iraqis when in power. He could turn to non-fiction during the long hours of isolation.
The trial will be a formal opportunity for him to tell his side of the story, something that we have been denied. The great mystery of the weapons-of-mass-destruction could finally end, since there is no scientist now in Iraq who need fear Saddam’s return to power. Saddam himself will doubtless say, if given a chance, that what he had was exhausted after the end of the first Gulf War. He will of course happily provide the names of the American and European companies who helped to equip him with such weapons during the days when it was intended for the Iranians.
There are other questions. Was there, for instance, a last-minute deal offered through a Lebanese businessman that could have averted war? We do not know what went on in the shadows, but it is a safe guess that some of the revelations might not play very well in an election year in Peoria, not after Howard Dean has made full use of it in a one-to-one debate with George Bush.
But the most important consequence of Saddam’s capture is the shift in the political chessboard of Iraq. The Shiites, so far, have been quiet, almost neutral, in the conflict between the Americans and the resistance, waiting for the antagonists of the first round to exhaust each other. They hated Saddam. The televised scenes of joy in Baghdad that were shown on Saddam’s arrest did not mention that most of those rejoicing were Shiites. That did not mean that they were celebrating the American presence.
George Bush has said that America wants to hand over power to Iraqis by June 1 and go home. Saddam Hussein’s arrest should make this process easier, because he is definitely out of play. But which Iraqis will inherit and how will their legitimacy be defined? If the means is going to be popular will then the ends might suit Tehran better than Washington. Such an evolution could become troublesome in an election year. If the Americans stay, the body bags will mount; if they leave, the chant from Baghdad’s streets will leave the American voter wondering what precisely George Bush achieved in Iraq.
The thought refuses to go away: Has Saddam Hussein been caught too soon for Bush’s electoral comfort? Has the applause come too early? The capture of Saddam next August or September would have given the defining bounce in opinion polls, without ebb-time.
There is another high-profile fugitive on the White House’s wish list. Perhaps a quiet word to Kabul and Islamabad should be passed on is that the best time to get lucky is the middle of next year. George Bush once said, Texas-style, that he wanted Osama dead or alive. Would he now prefer to delete one of those options?
