MANILA: Philippines election hopefuls like mayoral candidate Kerwin Espinosa have to ask themselves whether the job is worth taking a bullet.
The country’s elections commission, Comelec, recorded 46 acts of political violence between January 12 and April 11, including the shooting of Espinosa.
At a rally this month, someone from the crowd fired a bullet that went through his chest and exited his arm, leaving him bleeding but alive.
Others have been less lucky.
A city council hopeful, a polling officer and a village chief were among those killed in similar attacks in the run-up to mid-term elections on May 12.
Comelec said “fewer than 20” candidates have been killed so far this campaign season, which it notes is a drop.
“This is much lower, very low compared to the past,” commission spokesperson John Rex Laudiangco told AFP, citing a tally of about 100 deaths in the last general election.
Analysts warned that such violence will likely remain a fixture of the Philippines’ political landscape.
The immense influence of the posts is seen as something worth killing for.
Holding municipal office means control over jobs, police departments and disbursements of national tax funds, said Danilo Reyes, an associate professor at the University of the Philippines’ political science department.
“Local chief executives have discretion when it comes to how to allocate the funding, which projects, priorities,” he said.
Rule of law that becomes weaker the farther one gets from Manila also means that regional powerbrokers can act with effective impunity, said Cleve Arguelles, CEO of Manila-based WR Numero Research.
“Local political elites have their own kingdoms, armed groups and... patronage networks,” he said, noting violence is typically highest in the archipelago nation’s far north and south.
“The stakes are usually high in a local area where only one family is dominant or where there is involvement of private armed groups,” Arguelles said.
“If you lose control of... city hall, you don’t just lose popular support. You actually lose both economic and political power.”
In the absence of strong institutions to mediate disagreements, Reyes said, “confrontational violence” becomes the go-to.
Espinosa was waiting for his turn to speak at a campaign stop in central Leyte province on April 10 when a shooter emerged from the crowd and fired from about 50 meters (164 feet) away, according to police.
Police Brig. Gen. Jean Fajardo told reporters this week that seven police officers were “being investigated” as suspects.
Convictions, however, are hard to come by.
While Comelec’s Laudiangco insisted recent election-related shootings were all making their way through regional court systems, he could provide no numbers.
Data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project show that in 79 percent of violent acts targeting local government members between 2018 and 2022 the perpetrators were never identified.
National-level politicians, meanwhile, reliant on local political bases to deliver votes, have little incentive to press for serious investigations, said Reyes.
“The only way you can ensure national leaders win positions is for local allies to deliver votes,” he said.
“There are convictions but very rarely, and it depends on the potential political fallout on the national leaders as well as the local leaders.”
It’s part of the “grand bargain” in Philippine politics, Arguelles said.
Local elites are “tolerated by the national government so long as during election day they can also deliver votes when they’re needed.”
Three days after Espinosa’s shooting, a district board candidate and his driver were rushed to hospital after someone opened fire on them in the autonomous area of Mindanao.
Election-season violence has long plagued the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, known as the BARMM.
Comelec assumed “direct control” over the municipalities of Buluan and Datu Odin Sinsuat after municipal election officer Bai Maceda Lidasan Abo and her husband were shot dead last month.
Since last year, Comelec has held the power to directly control and supervise not only local election officials but also law enforcement.
Top police officials in the two municipalities were removed for “gross negligence and incompetence” after allegedly ignoring requests to provide security details for the slain Comelec official.
Their suspensions, however, will last only from “campaigning up to... the swearing-in of the winners,” Comelec’s Laudiangco said.
The commission’s actions were part of a “tried and tested security plan” that is showing real results, he said.
But he conceded that the interwoven nature of family, power and politics in the provinces would continue to create a combustible brew.
“You have a lot of closely related people in one given jurisdiction... That ensures polarization. It becomes personal between neighbors.
“We all know Filipinos are clannish, that’s our culture. But we’re improving slowly.”

New Delhi: Despite making up only about one-quarter of India’s overseas population, Indian nationals in Gulf states send almost 40 percent of the country’s bank remittances, the latest data shows.

India’s diaspora is one of the largest, accounting for 35.4 million people, based on last month’s estimates submitted to parliament by Minister of State for External Affairs Pabitra Margherita.

Members of the diaspora are a key source of India’s foreign currency inflows and, in the fiscal year 2023–24, sent home $118.7 billion, according to a remittances survey released in March by the Reserve Bank of India.

Indians living and working in the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries accounted for almost 40 percent of this amount, led by those in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar — 19.2 percent, 6.7 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively.

The 40-percent remittance share from Gulf-based Indians is disproportionately high compared to their share of the overall diaspora. Of the 35.4 million Indians living abroad, only 9.7 million — just slightly more than one-quarter — reside in GCC countries, according to data from India’s Ministry of External Affairs.

Dr. S. Irudaya Rajan, chair of the International Institute for Migration and Development in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, attributes the imbalance to the nature of Indian migration in the Middle East.

“People who go to work in the Gulf don’t plan to settle there, but work and bring money home and support the family ... they are coming to make money and secure their future in India,” Rajan told Arab News.

“They went to earn money with double work, midnight work, evening work, overtime work to send it back home.”

The reason why many of them are able to save and send more is that most travel to Gulf countries alone, focusing on work as there are no prospects of obtaining citizenship — unlike in other major migration destinations like the US and UK.

Out of the 4.3 million Indians living in the UAE, 2.65 million in Saudi Arabia, 1 million in Kuwait, 830,000 in Qatar, 665,000 in Oman and 350,000 in Bahrain, the majority were either unmarried or had their family waiting for them back home.

“Eighty percent of them are living alone ... they are not taking their wives, they are not taking their children,” Rajan said.

“Either they are unmarried and are sending money to their parents, or they are married and sending it to their wives and their parents, or they are sending it to their children studying in some other country.”

The actual amount of remittance coming from overseas Indians was likely much higher than what the central bank indicated. While the RBI’s survey covered 30 banks, two money transfer operators and two fintech companies in the cross-border remittance business, inward remittances from the Gulf also reach India through informal means.

Given the region’s proximity and frequent and cheap flights, money can be easily brought from places like Dubai without relying on bank transfers — unlike remittances from Europe, Singapore, or the US.

“From the informal channel, it can be as much as the formal channel,” Rajan said.

“All estimates on remittances are underestimated. The government of India, the World Bank, the RBI — all will underestimate the remittance because they can calculate it only from the formal channel.”

While the central bank’s data has shown an increase in the remittance share from the West and a drop from the Middle East compared with the previous survey in 2016-17, Rajan forecast that the Gulf will still continue to play a major role.

“These remittances coming from Canada, Australia (and the US), are more because they are vacating the place and coming home. People who are coming from America will bring all their savings, all that they had in America, so this is a short-term trend,” he said.

“I think the Gulf will bounce back ... the future will be very uncertain for migration, but Gulf migration will continue for at least the next 15 to 20 years.”