The great failure of America’s policy imagination is its Taliban misperception

Since the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan about three years ago and the re-emergence of the Afghan Taliban as the de-facto government, Washington has been focusing on the factors that led to the capture of power and the chaotic exit of its forces. No conclusive recommendations have been formulated so far to identify the reasons that led to the collapse of an Afghan government that needed a strong US military presence to survive. The failure of America’s planners to correctly assess the inherent flaws in their new scheme of things was the main reason of the undoing of a system linked to continued US military presence.

Last month, a study carried out by prominent and experienced US scholars and senior policymakers said the threat to their national interests from both Pakistan and Afghanistan had not subsided. They said the US just couldn’t abandon the region at the peril of its own interests and allow militancy to expand in control and influence in the two neighboring countries. 

However, this study is based off of a few problematic assumptions. As it highlights the presence of Daesh in Afghanistan and the activities of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), it assumes that the Taliban government gives continued support to the TTP for attacks on Pakistani territory and also sheds doubt on whether the Afghan Taliban government is seriously focused on eliminating Daesh.

Without basic historical and factual understandings, a lingering misperception in the American policy imagination remains.

Rustam Shah Mohmand

These are questionable assumptions and any fresh policy formulated on the basis of such unfounded opinions could lead to even more frustrations for the US. It is in fact not fair to assume that the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are pursuing similar agendas and are linked by common interests. Some basic facts are ignored in this logic. The Afghan Taliban who appeared on the political landscape of the country in 1994 were committed to two fundamental objectives. One was to expel foreign or occupation forces from the country and the other was to establish a new governance system based on Islamic law. The TTP on the other hand was created after 2001 in the wake of the induction of the Pakistan army into the tribal areas. It was generally believed the army had been brought into the tribal areas to safeguard US interests in Afghanistan. This perception created the strong and enduring resentment that eventually culminated in the creation of the TTP. Unless this rationale that is rooted in the culture and history of the tribal areas is not correctly understood, erroneous conclusions will continue to be drawn. And from those conclusions, no viable or sustainable resolutions can arise.

Similarly, it is incorrectly concluded that the Taliban and TTP have abiding common interests. Some elements of TTP may have extended support to the Taliban in their resistance against foreign occupation, but it was never their principal goal. Their struggle then and now is the restoration of the old governance system in the tribal areas. 

There is a belief in some quarters that TTP has launched successful attacks inside Pakistani territory with the help of the Taliban administration. The Taliban have strongly denied this accusation. What would the Taliban gain by helping to de-stabilize Pakistan’s border areas? Would the Taliban be so naïve as to support a militant group and lose the cooperation of a country so vital to their interests? Hundreds of thousands of Afghans are living in Pakistan and the two countries share a long border. Pakistan needs Afghanistan for its access to Central Asia; Afghanistan needs Pakistan for its access to the sea. Without this basic historical and factual understanding, a lingering misperception in the American policy imagination remains.

 And finally, perhaps an even bigger misperception in Washington is the inability to correctly understand the Taliban’s view of governance. The Taliban would never tolerate the presence of entities like Daesh or Turkistan Islamic movement on their soil if they could help it, and it is safe to assume they will deal decisively with them as soon as they acquire resources. Now that the country is isolated from international financial systems, the Afghan Taliban just don’t have the resources in manpower and equipment to destroy Daesh and other such groups.

In fact, the Afghan Taliban would like to foster working relations with the US and create an environment where US interests are not threatened by any group that operates from their soil. That pledge the Taliban would extend to any external or regional power. This is the great failing of US policy makers--- that they are not able to correctly read the Taliban mindset.

The continued isolation of Afghanistan will continuously lead to gross and dangerous misunderstandings in handling security issues that can instead be resolved relatively easily if a policy of engagement exists. The sooner this is accepted, the better it will be for regional and global safety.

– Rustam Shah Mohmand is a specialist of Afghanistan and Central Asian Affairs. He has served as Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan and also held position of Chief Commissioner Refugees for a decade.