Pakistan’s new counterterrorism strategy and all the questions it does not answer
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In June, Pakistan’s Central Apex Committee on the National Action Plan (NAP) announced a new counterterrorism framework called Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability) to reinvigorate ongoing efforts to curb extremism and militancy. The new framework aims to build on NAP’s implementation, announced in 2014 and revised in 2021, by focusing on its six neglected points. Under Azm-e-Istehkam, the existing kinetic efforts are to be complemented by support from other law enforcement agencies as well as legislative, socioeconomic and diplomatic measures.
On the face of it, Azm-e-Istehkam has three key components which differentiates it from previous counterterrorism operations.
First, Azm-e-Istehkam is not a new military operation like Rah-e-Nijat or Zarb-e-Azb which resulted in large-scale internal displacements of people in conflict zones. Rather, it will be the continuation of ongoing Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs) which will be expedited under improved institutional cooperation and coordination. It will combine NAP’s kinetic and non-kinetic components to build a decisive and irreversible momentum against terrorism in Pakistan.
Second, keeping in view Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s hideouts in Afghanistan, Azm-e-Istehkam will equally focus on diplomatic efforts to build pressure on the Taliban to stop the use of Afghan soil for militancy against Pakistan and withdraw its support from TTP. According to the United Nations’ recent report, the Taliban provide $50,500 on a monthly basis to TTP to make sure its fighters are paid on time and do not defect to Daesh-Khorasan. At the bilateral level, Pakistan tried to convince the Taliban to stop TTP from cross-border attacks without much success. Now, Pakistan will work with like-minded regional states like China to change the Taliban’s strategic calculus vis-à-vis TTP. The suicide attack on Chinese engineers working on the Dasu hydropower project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in April was planned in Afghanistan. Reportedly, following the suicide attack on Chinese engineers, Beijing has asked the Afghan Taliban to tighten the leash on the TTP as a precondition for Chinese investment in Afghanistan.
China’s growing frustration with the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan threatening its workers and investments is also a catalyst behind Azm-e-Istehkam’s launch.
Abdul Basit Khan
Third, beyond military and diplomatic aspects, Azm-e-Istehkam will also endeavor to regularize the informal economy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, which is a lucrative enterprise for terror groups to finance their activities. Terrorist groups like TTP immensely benefit from illegal border trade and smuggling between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Informal economy and smuggling activities also help militant groups in moving their men and assets between the two countries. Without formalizing the cross -border movement of people under a visa regime and controlling the informal economy costing billions to the national exchequer, overcoming the twin threats of extremism and terrorism will remain a pipe-dream.
Two major factors have shaped the environment leading up to Azm-e-Istehkam’s announcement. First, Pakistan’s growing frustration with the Taliban regime to fulfil its counterterrorism commitments under the Doha Agreement 2020. On the Taliban’s insistence, Pakistan entered into two short-lived peace deals with TTP in 2021 and 2022. Islamabad also tried to convince the Taliban to relocate TTP from the border areas and disarm the group without much success. The unprecedented surge in TTP’s attacks left Pakistan with no option but to announce a new counterterrorism initiative.
Second, China’s growing frustration with the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan threatening its workers and investments is also a catalyst behind Azm-e-Istehkam’s launch. During PM Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China in June, the safety and security of Chinese nationals working in Pakistan was a major talking point and security emerged as the primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors.
Despite its comprehensive nature, the new counterterrorism initiative raises more questions than providing answers. Initially, the government termed Azm-e-Istehkam as a new operation but reframed it as a strategy and a national vision to counter terrorism following a strong backlash from opposition parties who feared large-scale internal displacement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the most-affected region by the rise in militancy. These changing semantics have created more confusions than providing clarity to people reeling from the surge in militancy. Likewise, if Azm-e-Istehkam is not a new offensive but a continuation of the IBOs, they have failed to stop TTP’s growing attacks. There is no point in coining a new term and rebranding IBOs as Azm-e-Istehkam if no major changes are being introduced. At the same time, if Azm-e-Istehkam does not involve a new military offensive, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US Masood Khan’s request from Washington to provide “sophisticated small arms and communication equipment” for the new counterterrorism initiative is baffling.
Similarly, the opposition to Azm-e-Istehkam’s announcement from some political parties, especially from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, exposes the lack of consensus and stakeholders’ buy-in. The political parties have also raised concerns about the transparency of the new initiative and demanded a thorough review in the parliament. It would have been wise on the part of the government to build a consensus of stakeholders through the parliament before announcing Azm-e-Istehkam. The politicization of Azm-e-Istehkam is truly unfortunate. Public support is critical for the success of any counterterrorism initiative. Clearly, the government lacks the people’s support, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where political parties and civil societies have even brought out rallies against the new operation.
The above-mentioned confusions and divisions will benefit TTP which in retaliation has announced its own offensive, Azm-e-Shariat. Pakistan’s counter terrorism efforts are at an inflection point and they will continue to move in circles unless the government clarifies existing confusions and rises above political difference to create a genuine buy-in of all the stakeholders.
- The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X:@basitresearcher.
