Lebanese in limbo as prospect of war looms large

This summer, the drums of war are beating as strongly as the bass in Beirut’s nightclubs. They echo each other, the greater the risks of military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, the more the nightlife in Beirut gets stronger. Facing an uncertain future and an outcome they cannot control, a happy few choose to party the night away. And so, for many analysts and regional affairs observers, the question they repeatedly ask is no longer “Will Israel wage war against Hezbollah?” but rather “When will Israel wage war against Hezbollah?”

One must first state that there is, for all Lebanese, even those dancing the night away, a true sense of the danger and, at the same time and most importantly, an understanding that they have zero capacity to influence the outcome. As we all know, Hezbollah has hijacked the decisions of war and truce for the sovereign state. I use the term “truce” because, with Hezbollah, there is no peace possible, not even for the Lebanese.

Although the Lebanon-based Iranian militia has not fully entered the war that followed Hamas’ attack on Israel, it has initiated strikes in support of Hamas. This escalation has devastated southern Lebanon and intensified the ongoing military exchanges. And so, the Lebanese are asking if this will extend to the entire country, just as happened in 2006.

It has become apparent that the first part of the answer to the question of “when” is linked to the conclusion of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. Israel will not open a second front, especially with the cold treatment it would receive from Washington. Hence, it is expected that, once the Gaza campaign is over and its southern borders are secured, the next battlefront will be in the north against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Everyone understands that Israel needs to reestablish deterrence and can no longer accept the potential attacks Hezbollah can achieve. For its military establishment and a large part of the population, this has become unacceptable or unbearable.

At this stage, the likelihood of the conflict escalating is moderate, but in the medium to longer term it is high. Israel understands it needs to be fully prepared for such a step and it remembers the lessons of 2006. While many consider this past war as a collective punishment of Lebanon, the reality is that infrastructure was destroyed to break down Hezbollah’s support capacity. The fact is that Lebanon paid the price and, 18 years later, Israel’s deterrence has not been enhanced. Tel Aviv must answer two key questions: can it defeat Hezbollah and what will Tehran’s answer be?

Israel’s motivations are tied to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on restoring deterrence. It is also clear that Hezbollah’s endorsement, as ordered by Tehran, of the strategy of “unified fronts” and a refusal to enter into a separate settlement to de-escalate the northern front with Israel increases the risks in the longer term. I would say not too long because Israel is already in a state of war, so the next phase is auspicious for decisive action on all fronts, considering it the only option to achieve complete security for the north by completely uprooting Hezbollah and destroying its military infrastructure.

At this stage, the likelihood of the conflict escalating is moderate, but in the medium to longer term it is high

Khaled Abou Zahr

However, new developments could change the conflict equation entirely and warn of an expansion of the conflict into a wider regional war. The first is the recent reciprocal attacks between the Houthi group in Yemen and Israel, along with attacks by other groups in Iraq and Syria. The second is a potential Democratic administration in the US that is hostile to Israel and has historically chosen detente with the regime in Tehran.

Tel Aviv is being put in the corner. It understands Tehran’s message: “Hezbollah is respecting its rules of engagement but we have others that are not bound by this.” At the same time, the US has not reacted to this dangerous escalation from the Houthis. This is also increasing Tehran’s demands in its negotiations with Washington. While its proxies have a unified front, the US and Israel do not. For all these reasons, some analysts even go as far as considering that Tel Aviv might look to end decades of shadow wars and proxy attacks by launching a direct strike deep into Iran.

For now, Israel is trying to evaluate whether Iran will retaliate with all its proxies in case of a war with Hezbollah. And is the US capable or even willing to deter this potential escalation? In this scenario, short of a US deal, and unlike for Hamas or the Houthis, Tehran will likely go in with full force as Hezbollah is a core part of the regime. It is its indispensable Arabic arm for its nuclear curtain: on foreign policy, military, security and even money laundering. This is what has made it Lebanon’s de facto ruler.

On the other hand, in Lebanon, voices are rising to try and nominate a president and a prime minister, claiming that these roles stopped Lebanon from even greater destruction in 2006 and their absence will mark the end of the country in case of a new war. I would disagree. This time, it will make no difference, as the stakes are much higher. Lebanon’s fate will be decided elsewhere, with or without a sitting president.

I would call this next war — if it occurs — the great decision-maker for the future of not only Lebanon but the region. The Middle East has entered a new era and the Israeli strike on the port of Hodeidah in Yemen might be a warning to Hezbollah and Iran, or it might herald the outbreak of a regional war. Until then, the night is still young in Beirut.

• Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.