The Pakistani state’s failing counterinsurgency plan

In August-September, the spate of insurgent violence in Balochistan not only brings into sharp focus the changing character of separatist insurgency in the restive province but the counterproductive nature of the state’s high-handed counterinsurgency policy. The participation of educated youth from middle-class backgrounds in the insurgency, enhanced operational capabilities of the insurgent groups and effective use of social media platforms for propaganda warfare point to some concerning developments. Critically, the absence of a political strategy guiding the counterinsurgency operations as well as the lack of a political process to address the genuine grievances made matters worse. 

The current and fifth wave of the Baloch insurgency is the longest and most lethal. It has its genesis in the assassination of notable Baloch tribal elder and politician Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006. The ongoing unrest in Balochistan broke out on Bugti’s 18th death anniversary on August 26 when the Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) militants killed more than 70 people in multiple coordinated attacks in 10 different districts. For the first time in two decades, BLA managed to overwhelm the state apparatus for more than 12 hours and went on a killing spree as security reinforcements arrived late due to the blockade of Balochistan’s exit and entry points. 

In the August 26 attacks, BLA’s Majeed Brigade employed seven suicide bombers, including one female, to target a military camp in Lasbela district. The biographic details of suicide bombers released after the attacks reveal that most of them were in their 20’s and hailed from educated, middle-class backgrounds. For instance, the female suicide bomber Mahil Baloch was a student of law in Turbat University and hailed from a political family in Gwadar. She is the third woman suicide bomber of BLA’s Majeed Brigade. 

The participation of female suicide bombers in the separatist insurgency is a direct outcome of its middle-class nature. 

Abdul Basit Khan

The participation of the educated, middle-class, including women, points to the changing character of the Baloch conflict. With time, the tribal structures and clan loyalties have lost relevance in the Baloch insurgency as its center of gravity has moved from northeastern Balochistan to the southern Makran Belt. Balochistan’s southern districts are closer to Karachi. Over the years, urban migration, remittances, improving literacy rates among Baloch youth, increasing urbanization in the southern districts as well as the permeation of social media have birthed a more radical form of Baloch nationalism. The new generation of Baloch separatists espouse separatism over autonomy and openly embrace violent tactics like suicide terrorism. They do not carry tribal baggage or follow the clan loyalties of their predecessors. Their middle-class backgrounds have allowed them to bridge their internal differences and rise above tribal considerations to forge alliances like the Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), an alliance of the Baloch Liberation Front, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch Republican Guard and the Baloch Republican Army. The participation of female suicide bombers in the separatist insurgency is a direct outcome of its middle-class nature. 

The recent spate of violence has also established that the Baloch insurgency is no longer a low-level conflict where insurgents are blowing up gas pipelines, power pylons, railway tracks, mobile towers and far-off government facilities with crude bombs and hand grenades. The Baloch insurgents are using weapons left behind by the US in Afghanistan which are now being sold in the black market, such as M4 carbine rifles and thermal guns, among others. At the same time, the separatists have also shown better strategic skills in the recent wave of attacks. For instance, before launching the August 26 attacks, BLA blocked Balochistan’s main highways and destroyed the main railway bridge linking the province with the rest of Pakistan to prolong the attack duration and draw the media’s attention, which is oxygen for insurgent groups. In the last three years, the insurgents have stormed several military camps and other key installations in Balochistan, pointing to their offensive rather than a defensive posture. In other words, they are taking the war to the main highways and cities. They have used Balochistan’s sparsely populated terrain as a force-multiplier before disappearing in the mountains. 

Finally, the Baloch insurgents’ use of social media for propaganda warfare in tandem with their asymmetric kinetic warfare is equally concerning. 

The Pakistani state’s militarized policies and total disdain for political process has made recruitment easy for Baloch insurgents. In counterinsurgency, the use of military power is subordinated to a political strategy where the former paves the way for the latter to start a process of healing, reconciliation and development. Unfortunately, the current security template in Balochistan is over-militarized without any political component. 

As long as genuine Baloch grievances such as enforced disappearances, socio-economic marginalization and political exclusion are not addressed, the use of brutal force will only make matters worse. The Baloch conflict is currently deadlocked on the battlefield. Neither side is in a position to impose a military solution over the other and necessitates immediate negotiations. In asymmetric conflicts, prolonged battlefield deadlocks can result in more extreme forms of violence which we are witnessing in Balochistan. 

– The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher.