From Kashmir to Ukraine, addressing global nuclear flashpoints is an existential requirement

The regaining of the state-on-state conflicts’ significance in the strategic discourse has rung alarm bells about the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nine nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. The latent nuclear weapon states, such as Iran, South Korea, Ukraine, Japan, etc., are assessing their strategic environment to revamp their nuclear policies. The alarming reality is the shrinking space for nuclear arms control and disarmament and the further failure of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

Nuclear proliferation is at an inflection point, which could potentially break the ‘nuclear taboo’-a norm that discourages the use of nuclear weapons. This could increase the chances of using nukes in the ongoing two wars in Europe and the Middle East. Besides, the nuclear-armed states’ craze for modernizing their nuclear arsenals has increased vertical proliferation and created a favorable strategic environment for horizontal proliferation. Hence, the already fractured nuclear arms control regime will further weaken.  

Trump Administration 2.0 foreign and strategic policy will have a decisive impact on latent nuclear weapon states. The South Koreans have been contemplating acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal. Park Jin, who served as South Korean foreign minister until earlier this year, said that South Korea must “seriously consider all possible security options, including potentially acquiring nuclear capabilities,” if Trump resumes threats to withdraw US troops. Heorhii Tykhyi, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, stated that “Kyiv could develop a nuclear bomb within months if US support for Ukraine dried up under the incoming US President Donald Trump.” 

Pakistan has opposed the conventional and nuclear arms race without compromising on its defensive fence’s necessities. It understands that without having full spectrum nuclear deterrence potential, it cannot prevent India’s aggression.

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

The previous Trump administration unilaterally exited from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018, causing Iran to refurbish its uranium enrichment policy, entailing uranium enriched to approximately 60 percent purity, a level close to the threshold of about 93 percent considered weapons-grade. Currently, Iranian officials are openly debating ‘whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons would help or hurt Iran’s national security.’ 

Pakistan endorses universal nuclear disarmament initiatives but firmly opposes the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), a treaty banning the production of fissile material used as fuel for nuclear weapons. On November 12, 2024, it expressed satisfaction over passing four significant disarmament resolutions at the United Nations’ First Committee. However, last month, Mr. Usman Iqbal Jadoon, deputy permanent representative to the UN, categorically rejected the FMCT. He told the General Assembly’s First Committee, “A treaty which only results in a cut-off in the future production of fissile material would be a non-starter given that it would perpetuate asymmetries and will have no added value for nuclear disarmament.” Islamabad’s paradoxical approach necessitates critical examination.

Pakistan has supported all equitable and multilateral international measures to control nuclear weapons. It had sincerely advocated establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. However, India’s nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974, transformed the regional strategic environment. Immediately after the nuclear tests in 1998 and later, Pakistani officials’ statements advocated nuclear restraint. They entailed advocacy of measures to avoid a regional nuclear arms competition for security and economic reasons. These proposals include a Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia and a Convention to commit all states to eliminating nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has opposed the conventional and nuclear arms race without compromising on its defensive fence’s necessities. It understands that without having full spectrum nuclear deterrence potential, it cannot prevent India’s aggression against it. The South Asian strategic environment guided Pakistan’s nuclear arms control and disarmament policy. Indeed, the regional approach to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament is complementary to international endeavors toward de-nuclearization.

Since the beginning, Pakistan has maintained a principal stance on the FMCT: It endorses and supports a fissile material treaty that promotes both nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. Otherwise, the treaty would be discriminatory and thus ineffective. The treaty should go beyond mandating a cut-off of fissile material production and undertake the eradication of existing stockpiles. Therefore, Islamabad rejected the FMCT in the UNGA First Committee in October. 

The global trends favor vertical and horizontal proliferation. The 20th century nuclear nonproliferation regime fails to cope with new strategic developments. Consequently, the entire world is vulnerable to five nuclear flashpoints, i.e., Ukraine, Gaza, the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir. To avoid these flash points and nuclear arms race, the earnest need is to initiate multilateral and bilateral nuclear confidence-building measures. Without this, neither the great powers (China, Russia, and the US) nor regional rivals (India and Pakistan) can prevent the accidental and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

– Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is an Islamabad-based analyst and professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University. E-mail: [email protected], X: @zafar_jaspal