Pakistan’s struggle with militancy: The blunt blade strategy doesn’t work

Pakistan’s struggle with militancy: The blunt blade strategy doesn’t work

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The unforgiving hills of northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have long been a key battleground, both for armed confrontations as well as ideological struggles. Militancy is an old affliction in this region; a perennial problem that has been able to thrive due to the absence of good governance. As we watch another round of violence unfold, the question is not whether the militants have returned — it is how much damage they will be able to inflict before the next “comprehensive solution” is rolled out. Amid all the rhetoric about reform and repeatedly expressed resolutions for a complete victory, the only thing that has seemed constant so far is that the body count has kept rising.
The numbers are staggering — over 193 security personnel have so far this year lost their lives in counterterrorism operations. More than 35 terror attacks in October alone claimed over 40 civilian lives. Then, in one particularly chilling incident in Lower Kurram, over 100 civilians were killed in a single ambush and aftermath. These aren’t just statistics — they’re a glaring reminder that despite years of counterterrorism efforts, militants remain as entrenched as ever.
These militants no longer operate as ragtag groups with Kalashnikovs. They have evolved, developed complex financial networks, and have been able to recruit from the disenfranchised youth. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), it is estimated, rakes in billions through extortion, illegal taxation, and smuggling. These resources have allowed it to outlast all security operations. Though the state keeps responding with military might, the insurgents have managed to survive by offering what the state refuses to: civil services, protection, and a sense of order in the areas abandoned by the government.
A deeper question needs to be asked: what drives these groups? The answer lies in the socioeconomic conditions that breed extremism — poverty, lack of education, and high unemployment. The state has poured billions into counterterrorism operations, but without addressing these root causes; it is no wonder that its efforts have proven futile. The militants have learned to tap into the anger and frustration of young people in underdeveloped areas, promising a form of “justice” that the state has long abandoned. 

The Taliban must be pressured to dismantle militant networks in their territory. Diplomatic pressure, along with regional cooperation from countries like China and Russia, can help disrupt these cross-border threats.

Dr. Syed Kaleem Imam

Paul Collier, in his book, Development as a Weapon of Peace, argues that economic opportunities are the most effective weapon against insurgency. It’s not enough to fight back with guns and drones: the government needs to fight back with governance.
Kinetic measures are always a double-edged sword. They yield short-term gains but are no substitute for governance. The real issue isn’t lack of force; it’s the absence of a cohesive, long-term strategy that focuses on building institutions and empowering communities.
According to the World Bank’s 2018 Local Government Performance Index, decentralized governance where local authorities are empowered to act has a more lasting effect on peace than armed interventions. Yet, time and again, the state has opted for the easier route: send in the army, launch an operation, and call it a day. Just forgetting that fighting militancy with guns alone is like cutting weeds with a rusty blade while leaving the roots deeply entrenched in fertile soil. Meanwhile, local governments are left without the resources or authority to address the underlying grievances of the people.
The state needs to retake what it has ceded to the militants — not just militarily, but symbolically. This means providing an administration that listens to its people, responds to their needs, and is held accountable for its actions. To win, the state must be better at governing than the insurgents are at terrorizing.
One of the most glaring flaws in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy is its overreliance on extrajudicial tactics, such as “kill-and-dump” operations. Such tactics not only fuel militant propaganda, but also undermine the state’s legitimacy. Likewise, reliance on military courts to prosecute militants has deepened the public’s mistrust of the justice system, because these courts lack transparency. In a region where the state is often seen as a distant, oppressive force, such heavy-handed measures only alienate local populations further. 
To effectively combat militancy, the state must strengthen both its security measures and its governance framework. Militarily, Pakistan needs to refocus its efforts by providing resources and autonomy to local law enforcement agencies, such as the police and counter-terrorism departments. Backed by intelligence-sharing systems and inter-agency coordination, these must become the first line of defense.
Simultaneously, underserved districts should be given long-term investments in education, vocational training, health care, and infrastructure. As socio-economic inequalities are eliminated and more opportunities are created for the youth, their people will not be as vulnerable to extremist ideologies. 
These efforts must be complemented by external measures. Pakistan’s efforts to combat militancy have been hampered by the presence of safe havens in Afghanistan. The Taliban must be pressured to dismantle militant networks in their territory. Diplomatic pressure, along with regional cooperation from countries like China and Russia, can help disrupt these cross-border threats.
The state has long relied on force, but force is a blunt instrument that can only yield temporary peace. True success lies in providing solid governance — effective, transparent governance that can restore the state’s credibility and engage local communities. To defeat militancy, the state must prove that it can offer more than what the militants do: that is, not just security, but also justice, opportunity, and prosperity.

- The writer is former federal secretary/IGP- PhD in Politics and IR-teaching Law and Philosophy. X: @Kaleemimam. Email:[email protected]: fb@syedkaleemimam

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