Why Syrian Druze are placing faith in Damascus and not Israel for security

Syrians protested in Karama Square, Suweida city, on Feb. 25, in opposition to Israel’s call for the demilitarization of southern Syria and the creation of a buffer zone. (AFP/File)
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Updated 12 March 2025
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Why Syrian Druze are placing faith in Damascus and not Israel for security

  • Interim government reportedly negotiating with Suweida Druze to allow security forces into the southern stronghold
  • Israel has expressed willingness to defend Syria’s Druze, but many suspect this is a pretext for securing further buffer zones

LONDON: One day after the surprising agreement between the Syrian Arab Republic’s interim government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, there are reports of a similar pact in the offing between the government and Druze representatives in the Suwayda province.

The imminent agreement allows the Syrian authorities’ security forces access into the Druze stronghold in southern Syria, through liaison and cooperation with the two military leaders Laith Al-Bal’ous and Suleiman Abdul-Baqi, as well as local notables.

The agreement includes allowing the Suwayda population to join the government’s defense and security forces, and secure government jobs. It also grants the Druze community full recognition as a constituent part of the Syrian people.

In return, all security centers and facilities throughout the province will be handed to the interim government’s General Security Authority.




The Druze, who are spread across Syria, Lebanon and Israel, are an esoteric Islamic sect that branched out of Ismaili Shiism. (AFP/File)

Background to the developments

The fluid political situation in Syria was always destined to have regional repercussions because it is one of the most strategically important nations in the Near East.

The announcement by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Tel Aviv was committed “to protecting the Druze community in southern Syria” did not come as a surprise.

This was particularly so for observers who have been watching the unfolding saga closely since the 2011 Syrian uprising against the Bashar Assad regime.

Several factors must be taken into consideration when attempting to understand what is going on.

Importantly, one needs to remember that the 54-year-old regime of the Assads has not helped to safeguard freedoms, democracy and human rights.

The sectarian and police state gave huge advantages to the Assad clan’s Alawite minority, at the expense of the Sunni majority that makes up more than 75 percent of Syria’s population.




Israel has a small Druze community, and some 24,000 Druze also live in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 war and annexed in 1981. (AFP/File)

Rule under the two former presidents

The regime, given its minority base, also had to rely on the support of other religious minorities in confronting the continuing frustration of the Sunnis.

The 1982 Hama Massacre against the Muslim Brotherhood intensified the animosity and distrust, and pushed the country further down the road of political and sectarian polarization.

However, during that period the strong leadership and tactical savviness of Hafez Assad, who ruled between 1971 and his death in 2000, kept opposition at bay.

The regime had worked hard to reassure religious and sectarian minorities that its heavy-handed campaign in Hama was necessary to save them from supposed Islamist fundamentalism.

Hafez Assad’s shrewd reading and handling of the regional situation convinced the Iranian regime — his trusted ally since the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war — that its vision in the Near East was in safe hands.

That situation began to change when Hafez Assad’s grip on the regime began to weaken. There was first the death of his eldest son and heir apparent Basel in a road accident in 1994, and then his health deteriorated until his death in 2000.




Syria’s interim government announced on Monday that it had completed a military operation against a nascent insurgency. (AFP/File)

Bashar’s Syria

Hafez Assad’s second son Bashar, a medical doctor, who was groomed to be the heir after Maher’s death, became the de-facto leader with most of the political responsibilities, alliances and personnel.

However, Bashar did not have his father’s savviness and expertise. He further lacked widespread respect inside his father’s regime, and with the latter’s regional allies.

Many of his father’s veteran political and military lieutenants were marginalized. In addition, there was a sidelining of many of his father’s allies in Syria, as well as Lebanon, which had become a politically subservient entity.

More importantly, perhaps, Bashar did not gain the respect and trust of Iran, which by 2004 had become a powerful regional player, both in Lebanon through Hezbollah, and the post-Saddam Hussein Shiite-dominated Iraq.

In fact, Iran became the real power broker in both Lebanon and Iraq, leaving Bashar’s regime as a facade of influence.

In the meantime, Israel, which was keenly monitoring the change at the top in Syria, was preparing to deal with more Iranian involvement.




Some critics view Israel’s stated concern for the Druze as a smokescreen for establishing further buffer zones within Syria to protect its borders from potential extremist threats. (AFP/File)

Syria as viewed by Israel

Israel had been reassured of its peaceful borders with Syria since the war of 1973. Tel Aviv always believed that, despite the tough rhetoric, the Assad regime would pose no threat to its occupation of the Golan Heights.

However, Iran’s direct involvement in Lebanon required extra attention but the Israelis were not too worried. They believed Iran would never challenge the US in the region.

Still, Iran’s constant supposed blackmail was not a comforting scenario, against the background of its nuclear ambitions. Moreover, Hezbollah became a serious irritant.

Following the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, Hezbollah had increasing power, influence and confidence. It had a powerful grip on Lebanon’s politics, and control of the country’s southern borders with Israel.

The 2006 border war between Hezbollah and Israel was a significant development. It ended with Hezbollah turning its attention from the south to the Lebanese interior in 2008, when it attacked Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

The 2011 Uprising

After the 2011 Syrian uprising, Hezbollah underlined its regional mission when it joined the Syrian regime’s army to fight the rebels, along with several Shiite militias aligned with groups in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Syrian uprising, that would deteriorate into one of the region’s bloodiest wars, claimed about a million lives, displaced more than 10 million, and left many cities and villages in ruin.

The war widened, as never before, the sectarian divide in Syria, as well as in Lebanon and Iraq. More radical elements, local and foreign, joined the warring sides, further fueling fears.

As for the Druze community, it suffered like many others, especially in the conflict zones. Several Druze-inhabited areas were attacked or threatened by armed radical groups.




In such a deeply polarized region, outside assistance rarely guarantees security, stability, or peaceful coexistence. (AFP/File)

Attacks and fears

The first deadly attack was in December 2014 and claimed the lives of 37 civilians.

As reported by pro-regime sources, it targeted the village of Arnah and smaller neighboring Druze villages, on the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights.

The second took place on June 10, 2015, in the village of Qalb Lozeh in the northwestern province of Idlib by an armed group from Jabhat Al-Nusra, led by a certain Abdul-Rahman Al-Tunisi.

The attackers tried to confiscate the houses of villagers they accused of blasphemy and cooperating with Assad’s army, resulted in the killing of 24.

The worst attacks, however, were carried out by Daesh which targeted eight villages in the eastern part of the Suwayda province in July 2018, with 221 villagers killed and 200 others injured, in addition to many taken hostage.




Several factors must be considered in order to understand Israel’s interest in the Druze. (AFP/File)

The final event before Netanyahu’s controversial intervention, happened after the new Syrian Interim Government brought down Al-Assad’s regime.

Friction in the Damascus Druze suburb of Jeramana, between local Druze ‘defense groups’ and the ‘New” Syrian Army resulted from a quarrel, and the refusal the ‘defense groups’ to hand over their weapons.

The situation became intense as the Army was already facing challenges to its authority in other parts of the country, including the Alawite heartland in Lattakia and Tartous Provinces (northwest), and northeastern Syria where the Kurdish-majority SDF were active.

Israel, where more than 120 thousand Druze live, has always tried to play ‘The Druze Card’ during regional tension. Actually, the policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ has always proven to work in the Levant, and the Israeli Prime Minister felt the opportunity was there to score another political, by portraying Israel as the protector of the Druze.

He is surely aware of the ‘the protector of the Shiites’ role played by Iran, the ‘defender of the Sunnis’ claimed by Turkish Islamists, and of course, ‘the old supporters of Christendom’ by some conservative Western governments. Thus, Israel, in Netanyahu’s calculations cannot lose.

However, the surprising development with the SDF of northeastern Syria seems have to reassured the Druze of the pragmatism of the new Damascus regime. Also, the sad events in the northwest carried two warning signs to all involved:

The first is that the new regime must prove that it is a ‘government of all Syria’; and thus, be responsible for the well-being of all constituent Syrian communities.

The second is that any ‘foreign help’ may be politically costly; and in an acutely polarized region, such ‘help’ would not insure any safety, security or peaceful coexistence in return.

 


Houthi spokesperson: US-Houthi ceasefire deal does not include Israel

Updated 9 sec ago
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Houthi spokesperson: US-Houthi ceasefire deal does not include Israel

DUBAI: A ceasefire deal between Yemen's Houthis and the United States does not include operations against Israel "in any way, shape or form," the group's chief negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam told Reuters on Wednesday.


Aid agencies slam Israeli plans for Gaza aid distribution

Updated 4 min 21 sec ago
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Aid agencies slam Israeli plans for Gaza aid distribution

  • The blockade will continue until a large-scale evacuation of the population from northern and central areas to the south
  • The government has said that cutting off aid is the best way to pressure Hamas to release 59 Israeli hostages held in Gaza
  • Berlin feels a special responsibility toward Israel due to Germany’s legacy of the Holocaust and is traditionally cautious in its criticism of the government

JERUSALEM/GENEVA:: Aid agencies have criticized Israeli plans to take over distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza and use private companies to get food to families after two months in which the military has prevented supplies from entering the enclave.
Israel has provided few details about its plans, announced on Monday as part of an expanded operation that it says could include seizing the entire Gaza Strip.
For the moment, the blockade will continue until a large-scale evacuation of the population from northern and central areas to the south, where there will be a specially designated area cleared near the southern city of Rafah, Israeli officials have said.
They said those entering the zone will be vetted by Israeli forces to ensure that supplies do not reach Hamas, with what aid agencies have described as special “hubs” to handle distribution.
Israel has already cleared around a third of the territory to create “security zones” and the aid plan, combined with plans for moving much of the population to the south, has reinforced fears that the overall intention is full occupation.
The UN humanitarian agency OCHA said on Tuesday the plan was “the opposite of what is needed” and other agencies also questioned the plan, which they have only been briefed on verbally, according to two aid officials.
“It is totally wrong that a party to the conflict – in this case Israel — should be in control of lifesaving aid for civilians,” Jan Egeland, secretary general of the Norwegian Refugee Council said on the social media platform X.
“This new Israeli aid plan is both totally insufficient to meet the needs in Gaza, and a complete breach of all humanitarian principles,” he said.
COMPLEXITY OF DISTRIBUTION
Aid officials have frequently accused Israel of deliberately disregarding the complexity of aid distribution in an environment such as Gaza, laid waste by 19 months of a war that has destroyed much of its infrastructure and displaced almost all of its 2.3 million population several times.
They say the latest plans appear to echo previous Israeli ones for “humanitarian bubbles” or “civilian islands” that were rejected earlier in the war.
Israel has accused agencies including the United Nations of allowing large quantities of aid to fall into the hands of Hamas, which it accuses of seizing supplies intended for civilians and using them for its own forces.
“If Hamas continues to steal the aid from the people as well as earning money from it, the war will continue forever,” Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said in a statement.
The government has said that cutting off aid is the best way to pressure Hamas to release 59 Israeli hostages held in Gaza.
However, aid agencies say the plan would mean stripping vital protection from aid deliveries and effectively compel a transfer of civilians from the north to the south, contributing to conditions that could lead to their being forced out of Gaza permanently.
Israeli hard-liners have made no secret of their desire to see the Palestinian population moved out of Gaza, with politicians including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declaring the plan would result in a full occupation of Gaza.
An earlier Israeli plan, known as the General Eiland plan, foresaw severe restrictions on aid to Gaza as a way of choking off supplies to Hamas, and Israeli hard-liners have often harked back to the plan.
With many Palestinians believing that Israel’s ultimate aim is to use aid as leverage to force them to leave and to occupy Gaza, one aid official said, fundamental mistrust of Israel could undermine the system.
“Would you be comfortable with your enemy providing you with aid?” the official asked.

New German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed concern about Israel’s plans to take over the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza and said his new foreign minister would travel to Israel at the weekend.
“It must be clear that the Israeli government must fulfil its obligations under international law and that humanitarian aid must be provided in the Gaza Strip,” he told ARD television late on Tuesday.
“We view the developments of the last few days with considerable concern,” he said, adding Israel had the right to defend itself but must live up to its humanitarian obligations.
Berlin feels a special responsibility toward Israel due to Germany’s legacy of the Holocaust and is traditionally cautious in its criticism of the government.
In February, Merz drew criticism from some for saying he had invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and would find a way for him to visit without being arrested under a warrant by the International Criminal Court.
Israel announced its plans on Monday as part of an expanded operation it says could include seizing the entire Gaza Strip. (


Egypt, Qatar mediate for Gaza Strip humanitarian relief

Updated 07 May 2025
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Egypt, Qatar mediate for Gaza Strip humanitarian relief

DUBAI: Egypt and Qatar issued a joint statement on Wednesday affirming their ongoing mediation efforts to address a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.
Egypt and Qatar said their efforts are closely coordinated with the United States to reach an agreement that ensures civilian protection and resolves the humanitarian tragedy.


What recent arrests and ban mean for political influence of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood

Updated 07 May 2025
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What recent arrests and ban mean for political influence of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood

  • Moves seen as response to immediate security threats with organization’s legacy of activism under fresh scrutiny
  • Analysts say decision to outlaw the Brotherhood marks a turning point in reform, security and political identity

DUBAI: Jordan’s recent ban on the Muslim Brotherhood marks a historic rupture in the kingdom’s political landscape, ending decades of uneasy coexistence and raising urgent questions about the future of political Islam in the country.

The Brotherhood is now outlawed after authorities uncovered arms caches and arrested last month 16 people for allegedly plotting rocket and drone attacks that authorities said “aimed at targeting national security, sowing chaos and sabotaging within Jordan.”

Interior Minister Mazin Al-Farrayeh’s subsequent decision to declare membership of the organization and promotion of its ideology as illegal reinforced a 2020 court ruling that had been largely unenforced in what analysts described as a “strategy of containment.”

Jordan’s announcement comes at a time of heightened regional tension and surging Islamist activism amid Israel’s war on Gaza. The question on many political observers’ lips since the arrests has been: Why was Jordan targeted by Islamists, and how will the kingdom respond in the coming days?

The Brotherhood’s resurgence in the political spotlight coincided with the eruption of the war on Gaza, as it staged nationwide pro-Palestinian demonstrations.

The Brotherhood’s political trajectory shifted significantly following the government’s liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan. (AFP/File)

Hazem Salem Al-Damour, director-general of the Strategiecs think tank, said the group sought to exploit strong anti-Israel sentiment and deep-rooted grassroots support to rally backing for Hamas, the Palestinian militant group founded as a Brotherhood offshoot.

Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group’s transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties, often at odds with Jordan’s national interests, especially since Hamas’ offices were shut down in Jordan in 1999.

Authorities were further alarmed when investigations revealed that the busted Brotherhood cell had ties to Hamas’ Lebanese wing, which trained and funded some of the arrested militants. This followed a similar incident in May 2024, when Jordan accused the Brotherhood of involvement in a foiled plot by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons through Jordan.

At the time, the Brotherhood said that while some members may have acted independently, the organization itself was not involved and remained part of the loyal opposition. It also claimed that the weapons were not intended for use in or against Jordan, but were being transported to support Palestinians in Gaza in their fight against Israeli security forces.

However, Jordan has also witnessed a surge in attempts to smuggle weapons and explosives from Syria for delivery to the West Bank over the past year.

“In a sense, the government, with its ban on the Brotherhood, shut down the group’s external support networks, through which it had sought to exploit Jordan’s geographic position in the region,” Al-Damour told Arab News, referring to the April 23 ban.

According to Al-Damour, the government’s decision was driven by security concerns rather than political calculations, and that the Brotherhood’s dual approach — public activity paired with covert operations — had become unacceptable to the state.

On April 30, four of the 16 defendants were sentenced by Jordan’s state security court to 20 years in prison after being convicted of “possession of explosives, weapons and ammunition.”

Mohammed Abu Rumman, a former Jordanian minister of culture and youth, regards the perceived radicalization of the Brotherhood’s activities as unprecedented.

“The production of weapons, explosives and missiles, as well as planning of drone operations marked a significant shift in the mindset of young members of the movement, signaling a clear break from the organization’s traditional framework and presenting a new challenge for the state,” he told Arab News.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s cross-border, partisan character dates back to its founding. Inspired by the Egyptian organization established by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Jordanian branch began as a charitable entity and gradually expanded its reach, becoming deeply embedded in the country’s social and political landscape.

Pro-Hamas slogans at protests highlighted the group’s transnational and pan-Islamic loyalties. (AFP)

For more than four decades, the Brotherhood maintained a close alliance with the early Hashemite regime, backing the late King Hussein during pivotal moments, including the attempted military coup of 1957.

The absence of competing political forces — such as leftist and nationalist parties — due to martial law created a vacuum. This allowed the Islamist movement to broaden its religious-ideological outreach and deepen its political engagement across Jordanian society, including among labor unions and student groups.

The Brotherhood’s political trajectory shifted significantly following the government’s liberalization process in the wake of the April 1989 protests in southern Jordan.

With the lifting of martial law and the resumption of parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood expanded its charitable network by launching its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, in 1992. It quickly seized the moment, winning a strong bloc in the 11th parliament and earning broad popular support, establishing itself as a major political force.

Although the Brotherhood and its political wing retained distinct leaderships and organizational structures, the line between the two remained blurred.

Tensions between the movement and the government first emerged over the 1994 peace treaty with Israel and deepened in 1997, when the IAF chose to boycott the parliamentary elections.

By 2007, the Brotherhood viewed the regime’s policies as increasingly restrictive, particularly changes to the electoral law. The group participated in that year’s elections only symbolically, winning just six seats — a disappointing result that triggered a leadership crisis within the organization.

The 2011 “Arab Spring” revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state, as the ascent of Islamist regimes to power in Egypt and Tunisia sparked alarm in the kingdom.

In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the “Muslim Brotherhood Association,” in a move widely seen as an attempt to split the more hardline “hawks” from the moderate “doves.”

This new group was formed by leaders who had either been expelled from the original organization or resigned amid an increasingly bitter internal power struggle.

The 2011 “Arab Spring” revolts marked another period of tense relations in Jordan between the organization and the state. (AFP/File)

Abu Rumman, the former minister, says that Jordan’s decision to reinforce the 2020 court ruling aims to regulate political activity and ensure transparent participation, potentially benefiting the Brotherhood by pushing it away from the dualities that previously defined Islamist politics and caused internal divisions.

“The strict application of the rule of law requires the Brotherhood to clearly define its identity and role within the national framework, while cutting all foreign ties that raise ambiguity and suspicion,” he said.

The future now hinges on the findings of ongoing security investigations and the extent of the IAF’s links to the Brotherhood’s suspected activities. Soon after the activities of the Brotherhood were outlawed on April 23, Jordanian security forces raided the premises associated with it, acting in line with the new directive. The IAF has not been officially banned, though the authorities also carried out raids on its offices.

Al-Damour, from the think tank Strategiecs, outlined three possible scenarios: the ban remains limited to the Brotherhood, it extends to the IAF if its involvement is proven, or both are fully dismantled.

Under the Political Parties Law, the IAF could face a ban if its involvement in the plot is confirmed, a possibility that has grown after it suspended the membership of three accused members. This would mark a fundamental shift in Jordan’s political landscape and alter the course of reform announced in 2022.

If the IAF survives, Al-Damour said, it would need to formally sever ties with the banned Brotherhood, shrinking its size and influence by cutting off its traditional electoral base, mobilization network, and campaign funding. Alternatively, the party may attempt to circumvent the ban by quietly absorbing sympathizers and non-involved members of the banned group.

“Individuals from the banned group or its affiliated party may establish new licensed political parties, associations, or civil society organizations; and second, they may seek membership in already licensed Islamic parties. Their motivations could vary from genuine political participation and reform to quietly infiltrating these parties,” he said.

In 2015, Jordan passed a law dissolving the Brotherhood and transferring its assets to a newly established entity, the “Muslim Brotherhood Association.” (AFP)

However, according to him, a purely legal approach may not be enough to eradicate threats to national security. “This casts doubt on the likelihood that all members of the banned group will comply with the law,” Al-Damour said.

“Instead, the radical elements of the group may intensify covert activity similar to what the group practiced in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, and again after the July 30, 2013, revolution, as well as in Syria during the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s.”

Security and intelligence efforts will likely remain active and focused on tracking the organization’s radical remnants, their networks, and alignment with regional counterparts invested in their continued activity.

Amer Al-Sabaileh, a geopolitical and security expert, stresses the need for a clear state strategy that extends beyond security measures to address social and media aspects. “The organization has enjoyed freedom of operation for years, building extensive support networks,” he told Arab News.

“To contain these implications, the state should construct a strong, solid narrative that clearly communicates the risks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities within Jordan.”

Jordan’s break from the Muslim Brotherhood, then, is both a response to immediate security threats and a reckoning with the movement’s complex legacy. The question posed at the outset — why was Jordan targeted by Islamists? — finds its answer in the confluence of history, ideology and the shifting sands of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

The kingdom’s next steps may determine not only the fate of political Islam within its borders, but also the broader trajectory of reform, stability and national identity in a region where the lines between domestic dissent and regional conflict are increasingly blurred.

 


Israel attack on Sanaa airport caused $500 million in damage: director

Updated 46 min 49 sec ago
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Israel attack on Sanaa airport caused $500 million in damage: director

  • Sanaa airport suspends flights after ‘severe damage’ from Israel strikes: director

SANAA: Israel’s attack on the airport in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa destroyed terminal buildings and caused $500 million in damage, its director told Houthi media on Wednesday.
He said earlier in a statement on X that the airport was suspending all flights until further notice after sustaining “severe damage” in the Israeli strikes.
The strikes came after a Houthi missile gouged a crater near Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion airport on Sunday.
“Around $500 million in losses were caused by the Israeli aggression on Sanaa airport,” its general director Khaled alShaief told the Houthis’ Al-Masirah television.
“The enemy destroyed the terminals at Sanaa airport, including all equipment and devices,” he said, adding that a warehouse was also “completely leveled.”
Yemenia Airways lost three planes, he said, adding that six planes in total had been destroyed.
“There are alternatives to temporarily reopen the airport, and we need a long time to rehabilitate it and restore operations,” he said.
On Tuesday, the Houthi rebels and the United States agreed a ceasefire that would ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, mediator Oman said.
But the deal that was announced does not mention Israel, with the rebels vowing to respond to Tuesday’s strikes.
Houthi militants have been attacking Israel and merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since late 2023, saying they are acting in solidarity with the Palestinians as the Gaza war rages.
The Yemeni militants had paused their attacks during a recent two-month ceasefire in the Gaza war.
In March, they threatened to resume attacks on shipping over Israel’s aid blockade on the Gaza Strip, triggering a response from the US military, which began hammering the Houthis with near-daily air strikes.