Balochistan train hijacking: Insurgency on the fast track?

The recent hijacking of an entire train in Balochistan was a brutal reminder that armed, anti-state groups remain defiant and their tactics are only growing bolder by the day. It proved that years of kinetic operations, intelligence gathering and counteroffensives have been unable to bring the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) to heel. 

The ensuing military rescue operation left 33 assailants dead and freed nearly 350 hostages. Its ‘success’ came at a steep price — 31 lives lost, including soldiers, railway workers and civilians. The fallout extended beyond just bloodshed. It reignited regional tensions, with Islamabad accusing India and Afghanistan of backing the militants — allegations both nations swiftly denied. Instead of getting involved in the diplomatic blame game, however, it would have been worth asking a much deeper question: why has conflict persisted in Balochistan despite decades of military action?

Balochistan has been restive since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. The first rebellion erupted in 1948, and there were subsequent waves in 1958, 1962, and the most significant one in 1973-1977, which saw over 55,000 fighters take up arms. The current wave, which began in 2003, has been the longest of all. Its leadership and tactics have shifted over the years, but core grievances remain the same: greater autonomy, control over natural resources, and political rights.

What is the endgame in Balochistan? Should Pakistan take a page from Sri Lanka’s 2009 playbook, when Colombo wiped out the Tamil Tigers in a scorched-earth campaign?

- Syed Kaleem Imam

In response to the disturbances, successive governments relied on military force. But while every campaign was able to temporarily contain the violence, trouble invariably erupted again. It is worth asking why another approach wasn’t tried. After all, the Sindhi nationalist movement of the 1980s faded once its actors were politically integrated. Likewise, the MQM’s criminal enterprise of the 1990s was dismantled with a mix of force and negotiations. 

What is the endgame in Balochistan? Should Pakistan take a page from Sri Lanka’s 2009 playbook, when Colombo wiped out the Tamil Tigers in a scorched-earth campaign? Though it worked — the Tamil separatists were permanently neutralized — the choice came at a high cost. The government faced accusations of war crimes, displaced a massive number of people, and left the country with deep ethnic scars. Given the economic turmoil and political instability in Pakistan, can we afford such a high-stakes gamble? And, more importantly, is it guaranteed to eliminate the problem instead of merely forcing it underground?

There is also the Northern Ireland model for consideration, which involves a patient mix of negotiations, ceasefire and political engagement. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 ended decades of violence at the price of power-sharing with disgruntled elements, amnesty for combatants, and significant political concessions. In our case, past attempts at dialogue, such as the Balochistan reconciliation package of 2009, failed because of mistrust on both sides. Will another government be willing to offer the same terms given to Irish separatists?

The Colombian model is another option. Slow reconciliation, economic reintegration, and amnesty programs pacified most of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) fighters. But even after years of negotiations, some hard-liners persisted. With external players stoking the flames in Balochistan, do we have the luxury of relying on such a long-drawn-out process?

Then there’s Indonesia’s Aceh model. Jakarta granted the Aceh province special autonomy after years of armed conflict, withdrew its military forces, and incorporated former rebels into governance structures. Peace followed, but at a cost — it set a precedent for other nationalist movements. Can Pakistan risk emboldening similar groups elsewhere in its territory?

It bears noting that there’s a common theme in all these models: military crackdowns don’t work unless they’re backed by governance and development. Overlook local grievances, and armed groups will exploit them. Leave fault lines unaddressed, and foreign players will step in.

Our own past tells the same story. Operations Sherdil (2008), Rah-e-Rast (2009), and Rah-e-Nijat (2009-2010) dismantled militant strongholds but caused mass displacement and allowed cross-border networks to develop. Zarb-e-Azb (2014-2016) destroyed terrorist infrastructure, but triggered urban security challenges. Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017-present) reduced urban attacks, but failed to uproot rural networks. Let’s also not forget the Karachi Operation (2013), which significantly curbed crime and militancy but left political fault lines exposed. 

So, what does Pakistan choose? A Sri Lanka-style war is impractical, a Northern Ireland peace deal too slow, and the Colombian model too drawn out. The smarter approach is intelligence-driven security — proactive, rather than reactive measures. Meanwhile, political engagement is necessary. Balochistan’s people must feel represented, not repressed. Addressing root causes like poverty, exclusion, and governance gaps is critical. Economic development should benefit Balochistan’s locals, not just corporations and foreign investors. Otherwise, even if armed groups retreat, the sense of alienation will persist, which is an even bigger long-term threat.

Most importantly, Balochistan’s identity must be reclaimed before external forces reshape it based on their own interests. Mahrang Baloch, recently nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and recognized by TIME as one of its 100 Most Influential People, represents a rising voice in the Baloch struggle. Could engaging with real representatives— rather than dismissing them— make a difference? Could it save innocent lives? Pakistan has tried brute force. It has tried denial. Maybe it’s time to try something smarter.

The Baloch Jirga/Mei’rh, a time-honored model of mediation and reconciliation, has long resolved intra-tribal feuds through dialogue and negotiated settlements. If it can mend rifts among warring Baloch factions, why not extend its framework to win minds on the other side of the conflict?

The writer is former federal secretary/IGP- PhD in Politics and IR-teaching Law and Philosophy at Universities. He tweets@Kaleemimam. Email:skimam98@hotmail.com: fb@syedkaleemimam.