Reactions from militant groups to the India-Pakistan crisis provide critical insights

Militant groups, whether proxies or self-created, are byproducts of conflicts. They thrive in adverse situations by manipulating ideological and political fault-lines to forward their interests. During a crisis, such groups prey on political tensions and social anxieties to win public support and increase their influence.

Last month, as the India-Pakistan military conflict escalated, the diverse reactions of various South Asian militant groups across the ideological spectrum revealed a complex pattern. Their responses and positioning to the crisis provide critical insights into a regional threat landscape marked by fragmentation and outbidding for ideological supremacy and relevance. They responded to regional tensions through pre-existing world views to mobilize their respective support bases and fuel recruitment.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Qaeda’s franchise in South Asia, was the first militant group to issue a statement on the India-Pakistan crisis. AQIS condemned Indian military aggression in Pakistan targeting mosques, women and children, including the relatives of Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Masood Azhar. While condemning the attack, AQIS condoled with Azhar. At the same time, it vowed to resist Indian military aggression while positioning itself as the self-appointed guardian of South Asian Muslims, consistent with its trans-regional agenda.

Since its formation in 2014, anti-India rhetoric has been a central plank of AQIS’ ideological messaging. Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, AQIS shifted its focus to India, but has failed to carry out high-profile attacks unlike its ideological arch-nemesis, Daesh-Khorasan. AQIS characterized the events unfolding since the Pahalgam attack under its global narrative of Muslim victimhood and urged its followers to fight India. Since Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s killing, AQIS has been operationally inactive, and its reaction to the India-Pakistan conflict is aimed at exploiting the anger of Muslims in the region to fill its rank.

On the contrary, Daesh-Khorasan did not issue any official statement on India-Pakistan tensions. However, social media accounts affiliated with the terror group pointed their propaganda guns toward the Pakistani state for “not giving a befitting response to India.” By redirecting critique toward Pakistan, Daesh-Khorasan’s remaining rhetoric revolved usual themes of repudiating nationalism, democratic regimes of the Muslim-majority countries and holding them responsible for Muslims’ sufferings while also accusing them of “apostasy.” In doing so, it urged Muslims to reject territorial nationalism and revolt against their own regimes. Daesh-Khorasan embedded local and regional factors of India-Pakistan tensions into its transnational ideological framework and offered the creation of the self-styled “Caliphate” as the potential solution.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) did not jump on the anti-India bandwagon and gave a measured response aligned with the neutral position taken by the Taliban on the India-Pakistan crisis. Interestingly, TTP’s stance seemingly balances reactions of AQIS and Daesh-Khorasan. Instead of focusing on India, TTP blamed the Pakistani military, its main adversary, holding it responsible for the loss of life. At the same time, like AQIS, TTP also condoled with Masood Azhar and sympathized with civilians who lost their lives in Indian strikes.

A lowered threshold for future heightened India-Pakistan tensions has made the task of some of these militant groups easier: one militant can do the job for them.

Abdul Basit Khan

TTP’s position in the post-Pahalgam situation sharply contrasts with the terror group’s stance after the 2008 Mumbai attack when its founder Baitullah Mehsud threatened India and vowed to fight alongside the Pakistan Army if war broke out between the two South Asian rivals. TTP’s contrastive positions reveal its sharpening rivalry with the Pakistani state. In 2008, Pakistani political and military leaders were largely in favor of negotiations and opposed the kinetic approach to overcome terrorism. However, after the 2014 Peshawar school massacre, Pakistan has taken an uncompromising and hard stance, barring two temporary peace deals in 2021 and 2022, against the group. By blaming the Pakistani state, TTP tried to de-legitimize state institutions and galvanize support around the rhetoric of creating a Taliban-like Sharia state in Pakistan.

On the other end of the ideological spectrum, Baloch separatist groups, namely the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), used India-Pakistan tensions to malign the latter and openly appealed to the former for military and financial support to make a common cause against the Pakistani state. For instance, BLA pledged to support India in the event of military action against Pakistan by opening a front from the Western border. Meanwhile, BLF chief Dr. Allah Nazar in a video statement, requested India for weapons and military support. In doing so, BLA and BLF are trying to draw global attention to the Balochistan conflict and secure external help.

Separately, a new militant group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Kashmir (TTK), has also emerged in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan tensions. Identifying Maulana Maqbool Dar as the leader, TTK’s spokesperson Mufti Mehboob Butt outlined Kashmir’s independence from India and Pakistan through an armed struggle as its main goal. The group maintained that Kashmiri areas across the Line of Control will be the main locus of its militant campaign and the Indian Army as its main target.

The contrasting reactions of various militant groups to India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir and the emergence of a new outfit points to a rapidly evolving militant landscape in a fluid threat environment. Concerningly, India’s decision to consider any future terror attack as an act of war requires serious reconsideration. For example, it is well-known that Al-Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri was obsessed with the idea of provoking an India-Pakistan conflict through cross-border attacks. This was to deflect Pakistan’s military attention from the Afghanistan border to create breathing room for Al-Qaeda and other militant groups. A lowered threshold for future heightened India-Pakistan tensions has made the task of some of these militant groups easier: one militant can do the job for them. Placing the future of 1.66 billion people in the hands of terror groups is reckless to say the least.

- The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher