There are two key realities in the war-torn eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) — money and misery. The rebel leader Laurent Nkunda may claim he is protecting the DRC’s Tutsi minority from resurgent Hutu Interahamwe militias but it is clear his real aim is power and control of the country’s mineral riches. That is why he has now expanded the mission of his four-year rebellion to ousting what he claims is the corrupt regime of President Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa. The other reality is the misery being caused by his insurrection with credible human rights reports of mass executions, gang rapes and the displacement of more than a quarter of a million people fleeing the violence. It is this latest humanitarian catastrophe that has prompted African Union leaders, meeting in Kenya, to demand that the 17,000-strong UN MONUC peacekeeping force work harder to protect civilians and actively confront Nkunda’s soldiers. It is also being suggested that the AU send its own force to supplement the UN troops, only a few hundred of which have actually been deployed in and around the threatened town of Goma on Lake Kivu.
There is, however, a currently still hidden third reality to this conflict that suggests that an AU force might be unrealistic. This is the involvement of neighboring countries in this conflict. This is hardly new. In 1997 President Kabila’s father Laurent-Desire came to power from a rebellion in Eastern Congo that ended the venal 32-year rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko and was backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Mobutu was backed by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. But before he was assassinated Kabila père fell out with his allies and now his son has Zimbabwean commanders in his elite 7,000-strong Republican Guard and UN sources last week said they had seen Angolan troops fighting with government forces. Not for nothing has DRC’s civil strife been called “Africa’s world war.”
And there is an extra, little noted player — China.
One of Nkunda’s complaints is that Kabila has awarded a $5 billion minerals concession to Chinese companies in the east of the country. The dramatic growth of Beijing’s African influence has stemmed from its exclusively trade-based approach to states and its refusal to entertain any political considerations about them. Will the Chinese merely now sit on the sidelines, wait for the latest regional violence to subside and then seek to reaffirm their resources deal? Or is Beijing now prepared to use its influence with all six countries immediately involved to stop them fanning the flames of conflict?
There will be those that argue that with its rising economic and military power, China cannot avoid contributing to global conflict resolution. But it cannot serve Chinese commercial purposes to have Central Africa plunged into the renewal of a destructive and ultimately pointless cross-border struggle. Three million perished last time. Can Beijing stay aloof from further carnage or will it work with other powers to persuade DRC’s neighbors to pull back from disaster?
