Will Ashraf Ghani sabotage intra-Afghan talks?

It’s a battle of nerves. Afghanistan has entered a crucial phase of its long conflict. The biggest stumbling block to reconciliation — the issue of presence of foreign forces is in sight of being resolved. That should set the stage for ending hostilities. But there are formidable challenges to overcome.

At the core of the whole exercise of reconciliation and peace efforts is the thorny issue of whether in the event of a settlement with Taliban, the government of President Ashraf Ghani would be willing to cede power to the new dispensation? Will pressure from the US work to bring about an agreement on creating an interim government that is dominated by the Taliban? Will factions other than the Taliban and Ghani's government agree to be part of the new arrangement that would be an outcome of intra-Afghan dialogue? Will Ghani use his position and authority — whatever is left with him — to sabotage any agreement with the Taliban in the impending talks with the group to ensure that they don’t succeed?

For Ghani the stakes are high. He knows his job is on the line. He realizes the US is coming closer to the Taliban. He also knows other countries, relevant to Afghanistan, are showing signs of reaching out to Taliban. These include Russia, China, Iran and at the far end India as well. The odds are against the current scheme of things. But the Afghan president desperately wants desperately to hang on to power.

The option for Ghani is to ensure the talks don’t end up in a consensus on the formation of an interim government at his expense. He has created one obstacle after another to delay the commencement of talks with Taliban as envisioned in the Feb. 29 agreement between the Taliban and US. He cited one reason after another to prolong the process of prisoner swap. Then he called a grand council meeting to "authorize" him to release the prisoners. Having received the approval, he came out with another excuse. This time he pleaded that about 300 Taliban prisoners would be set free only when 20 important prisoners held by Taliban are released.  

For the last six months, Ashraf Ghani has been at his best in creating new hurdles in the path of intra-Afghan talks. He has succeeded in dismantling the spirit of the whole peace process. It is the ground realities that are keeping it alive.  

What would really work? Only incessant US pressure. But such pressure will be successful only when Kabul realizes it can no longer run the country without huge foreign funding if Western powers withhold financial assistance. Ghani would realize that the failure of intra-Afghan talks would mean that his government will no longer be propped up by inflows from major donors.   

Rustam Shah Mohmand

Under US pressure the talks would begin sooner or later. They would be difficult and the issues confronting the two sides are complex. Judging by his past conduct it will be safe to conclude that Ghani will use every stratagem to ensure the negotiations go on without producing a consensus on the issue of a mainstreaming the Taliban and restoring their position as a dominant party in a new set-up. That will not be a task too difficult to accomplish.

Ghani would forcefully argue, through his nominees in the talks, that here is an elected government and its doors are open to all, including the Taliban. This argument will carry conviction with many outside Afghanistan who are not aware of the genesis of the long conflict.  

To sabotage such talks is easy. There would be complicated issues of how an elected government could be made to surrender its mandate and relinquish power. This would not be easy to resolve. It is here that the Kabul government would appear to be speaking from a position of strength. The president would seek to deepen this impasse causing frustration in the ranks of Taliban leadership.  

Another weapon that he would employ is to press for a long ceasefire as the talks begin. For the Taliban accepting a ceasefire would be difficult because it would demotivate its cadres and spread confusion among the people supporting their cause and mission. But such divergence of perception and approach would fit into the government's strategy because this could lead to the failure of the talks. Failure of the talks would be a big victory for a president who seems to be the odd man out at the moment.
 
What would really work? Only incessant US pressure. But such pressure will be successful only when Kabul realizes it can no longer run the country without huge foreign funding if Western powers withhold financial assistance. Ghani would realize that the failure of intra-Afghan talks would mean that his government will no longer be propped up by inflows from major donors.
 
The failure would be disastrous for the country because it would let loose the forces of anarchy. Desertions from the army would increase, attacks on government installations would be also on the rise. As people lose faith in the outcome of intra-Afghan talks, they would lose hope for the future of the country. Then the die would be cast for a show of force.  

All those who are keen to see the start of the dialogue and see the process deliver a positive outcome, would have to watch the ensuing developments in the context of the threat that is posed to the whole process. The US carries a tremendous responsibility, and so do those with influence in Afghanistan. They have to realize the dangers posed to the process and rise above vested interests to consistently support the dialogue and counter the challenges that would emerge, as politicians market their own agendas at the expense of supreme national interests.

*Rustam Shah Mohmand is a specialist of Afghanistan and Central Asian Affairs. He has served as Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan and also held position of Chief Commissioner Refugees for a decade.