Iranians go to the polls but policy shifts are unlikely

Iran’s presidential election is scheduled to take place on Friday. Currently, no specific timeline has been established for the counting of votes and the subsequent announcement of the result. There is a strong possibility that the elections will proceed to a second round. In the event that no candidate achieves a majority — defined as 50 percent of the votes plus one — there will be a runoff election. This runoff will feature the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the initial round. The tentative date for this runoff election is set for a week’s time, July 5.

The presidential candidates have taken part in several debates, with discussions primarily centered on the economy, foreign policy and various cultural issues. Among the most contentious topics were the government’s treatment of women and the country’s stringent internet restrictions. Candidates engaged in heated exchanges over these issues, particularly focusing on the brutal crackdown on women who defy the mandatory hijab laws and the severe limitations imposed on internet freedom.

Nazanin, 28, a teacher from Tehran, pointed out: “I did not see a major difference between the candidates’ views. Even the so-called reformist (Masoud Pezeshkian) believes that mandatory hijab should be in place. All these candidates come from within the political establishment. They are not going to change anything. So I, like many Iranians, are not going to vote to show our dissatisfaction.”

Pezeshkian stands out in the political landscape as the only candidate advocating for improved relations with the West

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

Three candidates appear to be leading the polls: Pezeshkian, Saeed Jalili and Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf.

Qalibaf, who is the speaker of parliament, has an extensive background, having held multiple senior command positions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Jalili has had a long political career, with experience in various high-profile roles, including positions in the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council.

Meanwhile, Pezeshkian stands out as the sole so-called reformist candidate allowed to run in this election. A heart surgeon by training, Pezeshkian previously served as health minister in the administration of former President Mohammed Khatami.

The Guardian Council permitted one reformist candidate to participate in the election, likely with the strategic aim of boosting voter turnout and demonstrating the government’s legitimacy and popularity.

Pezeshkian stands out in the political landscape as the only candidate advocating for improved relations with the West. His inclusion in the election also offers a semblance of political diversity and a reformist perspective, which might appeal to a broader segment of the electorate. Pezeshkian’s platform, emphasizing the need for better diplomatic and economic ties with the West, contrasts with the more conservative positions of his rivals, potentially attracting voters who are dissatisfied with the current state of foreign relations and are eager for a shift in policy.

Nevertheless, the history of the Islamic Republic has demonstrated that, even when a reformist president is elected, significant policy changes do not often materialize. A prime example is the election of Khatami in 1997, which inspired considerable hope among young Iranians. Khatami secured nearly 70 percent of the vote, with turnout reaching an impressive 80 percent, one of the highest in the country’s electoral history.

The combined influence of the supreme leader and the IRGC creates a formidable structure of control

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

He campaigned on a platform that promised freedom of expression, tolerance and the development of civil society. Additionally, Khatami advocated for constructive diplomatic relations with other nations, including those in Asia and the EU, and supported an economic policy favoring a free market and foreign investment. Despite these progressive and hopeful promises, the expected policy changes largely failed to materialize, illustrating the challenges reformists face within the Islamic Republic’s political system. This historical context serves as a reminder of the complexities and limitations that reformist candidates encounter even after achieving electoral success.

In fact, the election of a reformist often triggers a counter-reaction from hard-liners, who intensify their crackdowns on society. This response serves as a message to the public that the hard-liners remain firmly in control and that any attempts to empower reformist elements will be met with increased repression.

Iran's domestic and foreign policies are primarily dictated by two powerful entities. The first is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who holds the ultimate authority and has the final say in all major policy decisions. The second influential entity is the senior cadre of the IRGC. The IRGC is far more than just a military institution; it exerts significant influence across nearly every sector of Iranian society, including the economy, telecommunications, manufacturing and shipping. This extensive reach allows the IRGC to play a pivotal role in shaping and enforcing both domestic and foreign policies, further consolidating its power and ensuring that its interests are deeply embedded in the fabric of Iranian governance.

The combined influence of the supreme leader and the IRGC creates a formidable structure of control that significantly impacts the direction of the country’s policies and its interactions with the rest of the world.

In essence, the president’s role predominantly involves shaping the national and international agenda, providing a framework within which the supreme leader and the senior cadre of the IRGC can execute their policies. It is crucial to note that the president operates within strict boundaries defined by these influential figures; he must navigate them carefully to avoid crossing any established limits or red lines.

In conclusion, historical precedent and Iran’s entrenched power structures suggest that substantive policy shifts are unlikely, no matter who wins the presidential election.

• Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian American political scientist. X: @Dr_Rafizadeh