How ethnicity, religion dominate Iranian domestic policies

Last week, I reviewed the nationalistic and sectarian dimensions of Iran’s foreign policy. In this article, I will address the same two dimensions but within the context of Iran’s domestic policy.

Iranian policy pivots on these two critical elements, both of which govern policy and strategies at home and abroad. These dimensions have been used by the Velayat-e Faqih regime to evade its domestic commitments by promoting a constant sense of fear and suspicion based on a forever-lurking external bogeyman who, the supreme leader insists, will target and destroy the country if the Iranian regime isn’t constantly engaged in efforts to crush this threat.

Domestically, it is known that Iran consists of various races, sects and religions. In its census, taken every 10 years, Iranian governments have avoided recording ethnicities to keep non-Persian communities in the dark about their actual sizes, allowing the state to downplay their significance. The available figures are pretty unreliable, but estimates can be made. Persians account for almost 51 percent of the population, while Turkish Azeris, who are the largest ethnic minority, account for about 23 percent. The Kurds in Western Iran account for about another 10 percent, while the tribal Lur group makes up approximately 6 percent. The Ahwazis in south and southwestern Iran account for a further 4 percent, while the Balochis in the country’s east and southeast and the Turkmen in the northeast each account for 2 percent of the Iranian ethnic mosaic. 

Power is concentrated in the hands of the Persians, or among those who accept Persian supremacism over the other ethnicities. Successive Iranian regimes have worked to change the demographics of ethnic minority regions in order to ensure that Persian dominance is unchallenged, particularly in the resource-rich areas of the Ahwazi Arab population, where more than 95 percent of Iran’s oil and gas resources, along with three of the country’s largest rivers, are located.

An ethnonationalistic atmosphere of Persian supremacy and of sectarian domination by the hard-line doctrine of the Velayat-e Faqih regime is actively promoted among ethnic minorities. In short, Persians are viewed and depicted as being superior to other ethnicities, while the regime’s fundamentalist Shiite doctrine is presented as the only truly legitimate faith, with other sects or religions being barely tolerated or simply banned. 

Power is concentrated in the hands of the Persians, or among those who accept Persian supremacism

Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami

Minorities are treated with disdain and denied the most fundamental rights, including the right to learn or be educated in their indigenous languages, to learn their own history or even to hold cultural gatherings celebrating their heritage. This significantly impacts their educational progress and reduces their chances of competing for senior positions in the country or moving ahead with postgraduate studies — essentially hindering their life opportunities.

In regards to sectarianism, while the previous monarchist system under the Pahlavis adopted a secular and nationalistic approach to most issues, the advent of the Iranian theocratic regime following the 1979 revolution — especially after the leadership of the new “Islamic Republic of Iran” had secular dissidents killed — one witnessed the promotion of a strongly fundamentalist sectarian world view that continues to this day. 

The Iranian Constitution, rewritten following the revolution to reflect the new theocratic regime’s ideology, enshrines sectarianism in every facet of the state’s existence. The Twelver Shiite doctrine was officially adopted by the state, with other religious and sectarian minorities in the country subjugated to it. Only those who ascribe to the state’s beliefs are permitted to assume senior positions in the government or state institutions, with all candidates approved by the supreme leader. 

Despite also being Muslim, the country’s Sunni population faces harsh restrictions; they are not even classified as a religious minority and are prohibited from taking any seats in the Iranian parliament. In contrast, Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians are permitted to do so. Sunnis are also currently suffering as a result of the Iranian regime’s deliberate conflation of sectarian affiliation and political loyalties, with all activities by Sunni citizens, however innocuous, being branded as sectarian, particularly when they protest for their fundamental human, political and cultural rights.

Any Sunni citizen wishing to get a scholarship abroad, attain an academic position at an Iranian university or work in the military or security sectors knows that the first condition and requirement is that they convert to and adopt the Velayat-e Faqih doctrine in theory and practice. Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians are excluded from any of the above opportunities, but, since Sunnis are not identified as a religious minority, they are the worst affected by these ideological and sectarian restrictions.

Meanwhile, if a person wishes to establish an activist group or party, they know that they will be unsuccessful unless they meet four essential criteria: They must be a full Iranian citizen, be aged over 18, have no significant criminal record and, arguably most importantly, be a practicing Shiite.

The level of the Iranian regime’s contempt for Sunnis is also shown by its refusal to allow the construction of even one Sunni mosque in the capital. Tehran is the only world capital without a single mosque for Sunnis, despite the city having a Sunni population of more than 1.5 million, and despite churches, synagogues and temples being available for the country’s Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. 

Some readers may wonder, on reading this, how minority adherents of the Velayat-e Faqih doctrine are regarded, and whether this makes any difference to their treatment by the Iranian regime. Unfortunately, even for minorities who practice the regime’s creed, ethnicity trumps religious sect, as is seen from the horrendous abuses of the majority-Shiite Ahwazi Arabs, whose sectarian affiliation has had no perceptible effect on stopping the regime’s brutal persecution.

For Iran’s regime, Arabs are the “other,” with their sect or any other feature always secondary to their reviled and abused ethnicity, regardless of their citizenship.

• Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is Head of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). Twitter: @mohalsulami