Talking to the enemy: Pakistan and TTP

Of late, Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — an outlawed umbrella terrorist organization responsible for fatal attacks in the country — started holding negotiations in an attempt to pre-empt the possibility of the group joining hands with Daesh. The talks between the arch enemies are being mediated by the Afghan Taliban, whom the TTP supported during their war against the United States (US). Can the history between the two groups allow for fair concessions resulting in the success of talks? Does negotiating with the terrorist organization mean emboldening the group that has killed tens of thousands of Pakistanis?

The TTP demands the reversal of the merger of Pakistan's erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an act passed with two-third majority of parliament. The reversal means removing the area from the constitutional outreach of the country, potentially making it a launching pad for terrorist activities. A source within the Pakistani government involved in the talks said, "It is simply not possible for the government to give in to this demand. We cannot even entertain this demand. It is not only unconstitutional, but bizarre."

Pakistan and the TTP both gained renewed confidence with the Afghan Taliban taking hold of Kabul in August last year. But to expect unequivocal support from the Afghan Taliban to either of the parties would be a mistake. The Taliban in Kabul have a tough choice to make: to side with the Pakistan government and disappoint their allies in war or cash concessions for the TTP and enrage yet one of the few countries that support their government. Disappointing the TTP also means risking the disgruntled members joining Daesh, an existential threat to the Afghan Taliban.  

The Taliban know better. They cannot afford to upset their long-term ideological ally that has pledged its allegiance to the group. Under the uncertain security circumstances, the Afghan Taliban will not be able to detach the TTP, fearing they might need the group's support in the future. Also, the senior leadership of the Afghan Taliban shares a strong bond with higher ranks of the TTP.  

Zabiullah Mujahid, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, said Pakistan’s stance of denying its territory to any group is its internal matter, indicating that the role of the Afghan Taliban — at least on paper — might not go beyond a formal attempt to mediate between two of their allies that they are beholden to.

Pakistan once again finds itself walking on eggshells. Even if it allows a drawdown in tribal areas and deploys civilian forces — a constitutional step — the threat of TTP's resurgence increases manifolds. If the Afghan Taliban fail to pressurize the TTP into withdrawing its demands, Pakistan will have no choice but to launch an all-out offensive against the insurgents.

Naila Mahsud

For Pakistan to meet any of the TTP’s demands, including retaining weapons, maintaining its organization and receiving autonomy for the places it once controlled, is not plausible. Without disbanding the organization, the risk of assaults on civilians persists. And granting autonomy to the tribal regions only means defeat against the terrorists.  

The only members of the TTP that can be allowed into Pakistani territory are the ones not involved in heinous crimes. Islamabad can also maneuver and share information with the Taliban in Kabul against the TTP members. It is highly unlikely for Pakistan to meet any of the major demands by the TTP, especially when it has recently managed to improve its position before the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  

The onus is on the Afghan Taliban to pressurize the TTP and fulfill their promise of not allowing Afghan soil to be used as a training hub for terrorism against Pakistan. As, according to Niccolo Michiavalli, it's better to make friends than enemies, but the cost of retaining the friendship should be well weighed before making any conclusive agreement. Giving concessions to the TTP means undermining efforts against other groups such as Daesh.  

Pakistan once again finds itself walking on eggshells. Even if it allows a drawdown in tribal areas and deploys civilian forces — a constitutional step — the threat of TTP's resurgence increases manifolds. If the Afghan Taliban fail to pressurize the TTP into withdrawing its demands, Pakistan will have no choice but to launch an all-out offensive against the insurgents. It might also deteriorate Islamabad's relationship with the Afghan Taliban, particularly at a time when the threat of Indian presence in Afghanistan looms large.

The best bet for Pakistan is to use its leverage on the Afghan Taliban, who in turn can use their sway over the TTP to reach an agreement without bloodshed. If the history of talks is to be believed, neither of the parties has a good track record of keeping their promises. The prospect of a long-term ceasefire is not very bright and underhand agreements do not last long, if the parties involved do not see eye to eye. Amid growing economic and political distress, Pakistan may find it perplexing to carry out a full-fledged operation like Zarb-e-Azb. But if the situation gets tough, it has to get tougher.

– Naila Mahsud is a Pakistani political and International relations researcher, with a focus on regional politics and security issues.

Twitter: @MahsudNaila