Why the world is in wait-and-see mode on Iran protests

The sister of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei last week supported protesters and called for the end of the regime. Former President Mohammed Khatami also called on the government of Iran to carry out reforms “before it is too late,” adding that freedom and security do not negate each other. The issue is whether it is already too late for the regime to reform. Should we expect a big bang? If so, what would be the repercussions?
The protests show one thing: The system as it is does not work. It needs a reboot, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. However, as I wrote in a previous article, the regime’s rigidity has prevented any change. Even the recent claim that the so-called morality police was to be abolished, which should not have had an effect on the security of the regime, was soon revoked. The initial report was based on the comments of Iranian Attorney General Mohammed Jafar Montazeri. Though his comments said the notorious morality police was under review, this does not mean that the hijab is no longer mandatory. Caving in to the protesters’ demands risks emboldening them. Also, the demands have migrated from the issue of the hijab to refusing the entire system.
According to one of my professional acquaintances, the regime is not a monolith; not everyone is ideological. Khamenei is ideological, of course, and now his leadership is at its weakest point. He is in poor health and his son Mojtaba, who is a potential successor, is very unpopular.
Khatami has warned that the regime might be at the point of no return and, unless urgent and immediate reforms take place, it might soon be too late. He described the slogan the protesters are chanting, “Woman, life, freedom,” as “a beautiful message that shows movement toward a better future.” He said the regime should recognize the mistakes of governance, while Khamenei’s sister said that she had relayed to her brother the demands of the people and their grievances, only for them to fall on deaf ears.
This means that people close to the regime are turning against it. However, those who are rejoicing that the regime might fall should be careful what they wish for. If the regime were to feel threatened and become desperate, it might take desperate measures. This might take the form of a foreign adventure. Iran has already attacked an oil tanker off the Gulf of Oman and the Kurds in northern Iraq since the protests began. However, if it gets really desperate, it might think of a bigger adventure to divert public attention.

If the regime were to feel threatened and become desperate, it might take desperate measures.

Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib

The markets in Iran went on strike for three days last week. Is that deja vu to the Iranian revolution? The regime has every reason to feel threatened and, to preserve its existence, it might resort to desperate measures and take risks that could have repercussions for the entire region. There is a process taking place and it is important to be steered in the right manner to minimize the consequences.
If the regime were to fall without a viable replacement in place, this would definitely result in chaos. This is why the transition should be steered in a particular manner to minimize the chaos. A crash in Iran might be as destabilizing as the 1979 revolution. The ideal would be to reach out to moderate elements within the regime and bring about the change necessary to cater to the needs of the Iranian people, who desire representation and dignity, and the needs of countries in the region, which want security.
The international community needs to orchestrate a soft landing for those protests. There is always a question mark about what might come next. Would it be worse than what we have now? However, it is easier said than done. How can the international community identify moderate members of the regime who can bring about change? And how can it engage with them? This is a complicated process.
And any foreign interference might even make the situation worse if not managed properly with the right people. The Arab Gulf, Israel and the West are in wait-and-see mode. However, a regime that is not necessarily more peaceful might emerge from these protests. One option would be for the power to be more concentrated in the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The guards are the power center with most gravitas in Iran. They were always wary of the army for its alleged loyalty to the shah.
This is why there is doubt that the army can stand up to the IRGC. What would happen if the IRGC took over from the religious authority? This could mean replacing Khamenei with a figurehead while the IRGC calls the shots. This could mean relaxing the rules at home but the foreign policy would not change. That could be one option. It would give the world the appearance of reform, even though it will not actually be reformed at all. In the current situation, does Iran still have the window to reform domestically and appease the popular anger? We are not so sure. What should the West and its allies do at this point in time? This is also a difficult question.
Now that the regime is weak, should they lend it a helping hand while imposing the condition of good behavior domestically as well as in the region? Maybe, but that will not necessarily work. The regime might agree to the conditions to get financial help so that it can appease the anger, but then it might renege on its promises. Also, the situation might have reached a point where the regime cannot redeem itself even if it wanted to. Facing all these uncertainties, it is difficult to craft a strategy or devise a policy on how to deal with the situation in Iran. Amid this cloudy scenery, the international community’s safest bet might be to just wait and see.

• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is an affiliated scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, and is president of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II.