Iran’s anti-regime protesters likely to escalate their demands

Following the outbreak of protests across Iran in September, the Iranian regime initially bet on them eventually dwindling and abating, as it had done with previous protests. In a bid to ensure the success of this bet and end the crisis, the regime has pursued a policy that combines efforts to calm and pacify the protesters, even while harshly repressing them.
Concerning the measures taken by the regime to quell public rage, it has condemned the killing of Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini that sparked the protests. The so-called morality police, which arrested Amini and took her to one of its detention facilities, where she was brutally beaten and killed for no reason other than for wearing the hijab “improperly,” expressed regret for her death.
Afterward, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi intervened and promised Amini’s family that an investigation would be launched to reveal the details of the incident. Other regime institutions called for the repeal of the legal provision that makes noncompliance with the mandatory hijab a criminal offence.
Regarding the measures taken by the regime to repress the protests, the police and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have used their standard brutal tactics to intimidate the protesters and force them to end the protests. All these measures, however, have failed and the protests are now in their third month. As a result, the regime has found itself in a tough position, facing intense internal and external pressures that necessitate some concessions.
In this context, Iranian Attorney General Mohammed Jafar Montazeri last week announced the disbandment of the notorious morality police during a meeting with several clerics in the city of Qom. Further, Montazeri stated that the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the judiciary would review the mandatory hijab law.
This belated decision, which might indicate a tactical shift on the Iranian regime’s part, was nothing more than an attempt to contain the growing public anger and momentum, which appears to pose the greatest threat to it since it took power in 1979. Whatever the reasoning behind it, however, the move was an admission by the regime that it is facing a profound existential crisis that forced it to bend to protesters’ demands and Western pressure.
The move also gives protesters hope that their voices will be heard and their demands will be met, encouraging them to continue their protests. As a result, contrary to the Iranian regime’s calculation, the tactic of disbanding the morality police will not be seen as a sufficient reason to end the protests but will be viewed as a move reflecting the regime’s weakness and desperation, hence adding more impetus to the protests.
The protesters’ demands now transcend any factional demands, with the protests directly targeting the regime’s top figures — particularly the so-called Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has been repeatedly targeted with chants like “Death to the Dictator.” This is clear in the way that the protests have continued unabated in the days since the announcement of the disbandment of the morality police, with calls for general strikes in various Iranian cities and provinces.
While the protests that have been ongoing since September were initially triggered by the killing of Amini, this incident was not the sole motivation or root cause. These protests are, in reality, the culmination of decades of public anger because of systemic repression, human rights violations, marginalization, poverty, deprivation, corruption and the squandering of the country’s resources for the sake of absurd and fruitless extraterritorial expansionist ambitions.
Public mistrust of official statements and the regime’s intentions have created the impression among Iranians that the supposed disbandment of the morality police is merely a cynical tactic to prevent the protests from escalating into an all-out popular uprising like the one that toppled Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1979. The Iranian people believe that, even if the morality police is actually dissolved, the body’s tasks will simply be transferred to other state apparatuses.
For the Iranian street, the regime’s review of the mandatory hijab law does not imply that it will reverse the mandatory wearing of the hijab in the country because this matter is deemed to be an integral part of the theocratic regime’s ideological identity.

The regime has found itself in a tough position, facing intense internal and external pressures that necessitate some concessions.

Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami

On balance, it is apparent that the protests of the past three months at first prompted the Iranian regime to use all means possible to quell them, including severe repression, arrests and killings. When all these efforts failed, however, the regime belatedly acknowledged that it faced excessive pressure from protesters for their demands to be met. This time, the people have grown more confident, no longer limiting their demands to the issue of the hijab but insisting that they must uproot the regime.
Despite the attorney general’s remarks concerning the disbandment of the morality police, no official statement supporting his announcement has yet been issued. If his announcement truly reflects the regime’s intentions, this means that the protesters’ pressure has begun to bear fruit. The next phase will undoubtedly see not only an escalation of protests, but also an effort to raise the bar of demands. Protesters will demand an immediate resolution to other issues that have long been deemed off-limits, such as Khamenei’s absolute powers and the IRGC’s involvement in politics and the economy. In addition, they are likely to push for greater social and political freedoms and guarantees to ensure that Iran’s minorities have representation in the country’s governance and that their rights are protected.

• Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). Twitter: @mohalsulami